The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
39.
During the
summer of 2001 the UK had been exploring the way forward with
the
US, Russia
and France on a draft Security Council resolution to put in place a
“smart
sanctions”
regime:
•
The US had
agreed that a straight rollover of the Oil-for-Food (OFF)
provisions
would be
seen as a defeat and supported reviving the UK’s draft resolution.
But
it had not
agreed the final form such a resolution should take.
•
France had
come to the broad conclusion that a rollover would strengthen
the
hawks in
the US Administration. The UK draft resolution would be a
starting
point but
French support was “tepid”.
•
Russia had
set out its arguments about the defects of the UK draft but the
FCO
formed “the
impression that the problems … were not
insuperable”.22
40.
In the context
of questions about the attitude towards Iraq in September
2001,
Mr Blair
emphasised that the nature of the Iraqi regime had made a
difference to the
nature of
the WMD threat and that Saddam Hussein’s “profoundly wicked”
mindset
“definitely
impacted on our thinking”.23
41.
Mr Blair told
the Inquiry that, until 11 September 2001, the UK had a policy
of
containment,
but sanctions were eroding.24
The policy
was “partially successful”,
but it did
not mean that Saddam Hussein was “not still developing his
[prohibited]
programmes”.
42.
On 11
September 2001 three aircraft were hijacked and flown into the twin
towers of
the World
Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. A fourth
hijacked
aircraft
crashed in Pennsylvania. The attacks were unprecedented and
resulted in
the largest
ever loss of life from an enemy attack on the territory of the
United States.
Nearly
3,000 people died, including 67 British citizens.25
43.
The UK’s
response to the attacks was to offer support to the US,
including
constructing
an agenda for action against international terrorism and
co-opting
international
support.
44.
On 12
September Mr Blair wrote to President Bush advocating
action
before
further catastrophes, including a suggestion that the Taliban
regime
in Afghanistan
should be presented with a demand to yield Usama Bin
Laden
and close
the Al Qaida camps.
22
Minute
McKane to Manning, 18 September 2001, ‘Iraq
Stocktake’.
23
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 66.
24
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, page 8.
25
The
Guardian, 18 August
2002, 9/11 in
numbers.
320