The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

“I have never come across an issue in which the dividing line between overwhelming

support and overwhelming opposition is so slender.”

614. Mr Blair added that, in the UK, which was “reasonably typical of European opinion”,

“large majorities” believed:

• Saddam Hussein was “a threat and needs disarming”;

• “without the threat of action, he wouldn’t disarm”; and

• “in military action if there is a new UN resolution or even without a resolution if

we had a majority of the UNSC … ie France would veto and we could still do it.”

615. Mr Blair wrote: “Around 80 percent” in the UK supported an ultimatum and

acknowledged that inspections could only work if Saddam co-operated. Yet a majority

opposed action at that time. The “only explanation” was that:

“… they needed to be persuaded that the US and UK would prefer peaceful

disarmament if that were possible. Proving it isn’t possible is the huge benefit

of the ultimatum route.”

616. Finally, Mr Blair offered “two further thoughts”:

• “Publishing the MEPP Road Map would have a massive impact in Europe

and the Arab world.”

• There was a “need to start firming up the humanitarian work for the aftermath

of the conflict … and show how we will protect and improve the lives of

Iraqi people.”

617. Mr Campbell wrote that the Note had set out the basic strategy: “that we put down

a UNSCR, not to push to a vote, instead use it like an ultimatum, give him two weeks

or so to take us to the French date of 14 March.”165

618. In their discussion at lunchtime on 19 February, Mr Straw and Secretary Powell

discussed the fact that Dr Blix was “not yet ready to say that Iraq was not co-operating

on substance” and the difficulties of agreeing a list of tests with him that “set the bar

satisfactorily high”.166

619. Sir David Manning spoke to Dr Rice before the phone call between Mr Blair and

President Bush on 19 February to explain the UK’s thinking. He reported that he had

“emphasised yet again that … It was critical to give ourselves enough time to secure

nine votes.”167

165 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:

Countdown to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

166 Letter McDonald to Manning, 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Conversation with

Colin Powell, 19 February’.

167 Letter Manning to McDonald, 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.

290