The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
46.
Mr McKane also
reported that the term “overthrow” was being interpreted in
different
ways. The
“more muscular variants” appeared impractical. At the other end of
the
spectrum
could be a “more rhetorical approach”, focusing international
attention on the
behaviour
of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
47.
Mr McKane set
out the actions agreed at the meeting, including:
•
the MOD
would look at “military alternatives to the NFZs that still meet
our
fundamental
objectives”;
•
the FCO
would prepare briefing for Ministers and senior officials for
initial
contacts
with the new US team. That should not “prescribe options, but
stress
that we
remain shoulder to shoulder with the US in tackling the problem and
are
willing to
discuss with an open mind how best to achieve our objectives”;
and
•
no further
drafts of the options paper were required.
48.
The JIC
judged that Iraq’s relations with the Arab and Islamic world
continued
to improve,
driven by trade and political factors.
49.
On 23
November, at No.10’s request, the JIC assessed developments in
Iraq’s
50.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements included:
•
Saddam
Hussein was “exploiting
the crisis in Israel and the
Occupied
Territories
to improve
Iraq’s relations with the Arab and Islamic world …
many Arab
leaders now see revived relations with Iraq as a justified
response
to
perceived
bias by Washington towards Israel and double standards
on
UN
resolution”.
•
Most Arab
countries now believed that “economic
sanctions against Iraq
should be
lifted. But the Gulf
States in particular are afraid of Saddam’s
ambitions
and will want military sanctions to continue while he
remains
in
power.”
•
Commercial
ties between Syria and Iraq had “gathered pace this year.
Oil
smuggling
and illegal trade is likely to increase further.” Syria would
“remain
cautious
about forging closer political and military ties with
Saddam”.
•
Jordan and
Egypt believed that “Iraq’s isolation … is at an end” and both
were
“likely to
increase contacts and trade with Iraq”.
•
Kuwait
would “not
revive its relations with Baghdad while Saddam remains
in power”.
With the exception of Kuwait, all Gulf states were “likely to
face
pressure for a
further warming of relations with Baghdad,
especially if the
crisis in
Israel continues …”
•
Relations
between Iraq and Iran were “unlikely to
change dramatically”.
35
JIC
Assessment, 23 November 2000, ‘Iraq: Regional
Rapprochement’.
200