The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

893. In the margins of the ESC, Mr Prentice spoke to Dr Rubaie who told him that

Prime Minister Maliki “had been led by others around him into an exaggerated sense of

the urgency and a radical underestimation of the challenges” in Basra.439

894. In response to an email providing an account of discussions in the margins of the

ESC, Mr Brown commented early on the morning of 30 March:

“Need to be clear of

(a) build up of local military and police strength – how big is it and how will it

grow?

(b) conditions in which we would intervene.”440

895. Mr Brown’s Private Secretary replied that “a kinetic action would be triggered by

a request from the Iraqis or Petraeus. Commanders on the ground have delegated

authority to take realtime decisions”.441 The most likely scenario would be for UK forces

to support Iraqi units with a Quick Reaction Force, which ACM Stirrup had authorised for

use if needed. The Private Secretary undertook to pass on to Mr Browne the message

that there should be no specific announcements about UK troop numbers, given the

current situation in Basra.

896. The same Private Secretary provided a further update on the situation in Basra to

Mr Brown later that morning.442

897. In response, Mr Brown asked the Private Secretary to “summarise options now

available to us”.443

898. The Private Secretary replied, “the short version is that our options are limited” and

commented that Mr Miliband and Mr Browne were likely to conclude:

“… that it makes it more important that we accelerate drawdown of UK troops once

we are through the current crisis. The challenge for the next month is to judge how

to pitch this to Bush, how to create the conditions to show that it is from a position

of strength, and how to manage the presentation in a way that does not make the

wider US effort more difficult.”444

899. On Sunday 30 March, the British Embassy Office Basra reported that the overall

situation in Basra was unchanged.445 Neither the militia nor the ISF had made gains but

“ISF continue to show no sign of coherent planning, and troop morale remains low”.

439 eGram 11977/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 29 March 2008, ‘Baghdad: Update on Security Events and

Political Implications’.

440 Email Brown to Fletcher, 30 March 2008, [untitled].

441 Email Fletcher to Brown, 30 March 2008, [untitled].

442 Email Fletcher to Brown, 30 March 2008, ‘Re: Basra Latest’.

443 Email Brown to Fletcher, 30 March 2008, ‘Re: Basra Latest’.

444 Email Fletcher to Brown, 30 March 2008, ‘Re: Basra Latest’.

445 eGram 12015/08 Basra to FCO London, 30 March 2008, ‘Basra – Update 30 March’.

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