3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
314.
In the
first of two conversations with President Bush on 2 October,
Mr Blair
initially
focused on achieving a tough regime for inspections as more
important
than the
issue of a two stage approach.
315.
Mr Blair
spoke twice to President Bush on the afternoon of 2
October.106
316.
In the first
conversation, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed their
concerns
about the
outcome of Dr Blix’s talks with Iraqi representatives in
Vienna on 1 October
and that
the burden of proof that he had no WMD must be on Saddam
Hussein.
317.
Mr Blair
told President Bush that the need to ensure a sufficiently strong
inspection
regime was
“more important than the question of one resolution or two”. The
inspectors
should “go
in as soon as possible”.
318.
Mr Blair
set out three options in descending order of
preference:
•
two
resolutions (as set out by Sir David Manning);
•
a “tough
resolution keeping open whether a second resolution would
be
needed,
with others knowing that we would be prepared to act without a
second
resolution
if necessary. We need not rule out a second resolution, but we
should
not tie
ourselves to one”; and
•
the “worst
outcome” of requiring a second resolution but not being able to get
it.
319.
In a
conversation with Dr Rice between the two discussions between
Mr Blair and
President
Bush, Sir David Manning pursued the argument for two
resolutions.107
He
also
suggested
that Mr Blair and President Bush should confer about the scale
of the deceit
that would
require military action: “We would want to establish a ‘pattern of
deceit’ rather
than a
specific incident as a trigger.”
320.
Separately,
Mr Straw was informed by Secretary Powell that the White House
was
interpreting
Mr Blair’s conversation with President Bush as support for a
single resolution
and that
some in the US were warning the President about the dangers of
being mired in
the
UN.108
Mr Straw
had talked him through the UK proposals for modifying the
existing
resolution
which Sir Jeremy Greenstock thought France would agree. They agreed
it
was worth
trying to get President Bush’s agreement.
321.
In the
subsequent conversation Mr Blair suggested draft language for
the
resolution
implying a second resolution would be sought if Iraq failed to
comply
with the
provisions in the new resolution and indicating that the Security
Council
would be
willing to authorise force in those circumstances.
106
Letter
Rycroft to Sedwill, 2 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Telephone Calls with Bush, 2 October’.
107
Letter
Rycroft to Sedwill, 2 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Telephone Calls with Bush, 2 October’.
108
Letter
Straw to Manning, 2 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversations with Colin
Powell’.
257