11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
132.
On 4 February,
in response to a question from Mr Llew Smith, Mr O’Brien
told the
House of
Commons that:
“The
process of de‑Ba’athification is an Iraqi led process. Guidelines
were
announced
by the Iraqi Governing Council on 11 January and provide a
clear
framework
for this process. The Transitional Administrative Law, which will
include
the
criteria for nomination to the Transitional National Assembly, is
in the final
stages of
drafting. It is likely to follow the existing practice that
nominees shall
not have
been a member of the dissolved Ba’ath Party at the rank of
Division
Member …
[the fourth tier of membership] or higher – unless exempted by
the
National De
Ba’athification Commission – or a member of the past agencies
of
repression,
or one who participated in the oppression of
citizens.”118
133.
The TAL
published on 8 March contained the following restrictions on
former
members of
the Ba’ath Party:
•
Senior
members (fourth tier and above) were not eligible to stand unless
they
had been
successful in their appeal to the de‑Ba’athification
Commission.
•
“Full”
members would be required to renounce the Ba’ath Party and swear
they
had no
further dealings or connections with Ba’athist
organisations.119
134.
In late March,
Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported to the FCO in London,
following
a discussion
between his staff and Ambassador Bremer, that:
“Bremer
remains committed to de‑Ba’athification but believes that Chalabi
has
abused the
process by emphasising its retributive elements and ignoring the
appeals
procedures
… Given the fragile security situation … Bremer is keen to make
the
process
appear as independent and fair as possible.”120
135.
Sir Jeremy
reported that Ambassador Bremer was considering taking
responsibility
for
de‑Ba’athification away from the GC, and giving it to an
independent body. As a
first step,
he intended to write to Dr Chalabi, asking for changes to
de‑Ba’athification
procedures.
136.
In April,
Mr Dominic Asquith, Deputy Chief Commissioner in the CPA,
reported
that
Ambassador Bremer was seeking to expedite efforts to address Sunni
concerns,
in particular
taking “steps designed to make the [de‑Ba’athification] process
appear less
partisan by
taking responsibility for the process away from Ahmed Chalabi … he
also
wants
blanket exemptions for teachers”.121
118
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 4
February 2004, column 907W.
119
Iraqi
Transitional Administrative Law, 8 March 2004, Articles 31(B)(2)
and (3).
120
Telegram
107 IraqRep to FCO London, 25 March 2004, ‘Iraq: de‑Ba’athification
progress’.
121
Telegram
181 IraqRep to FCO London, 21 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Sunni
Politics’.
29