The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
749.
Mr Roger
Cornish, MOD Deputy Director Iraq, wrote to Mr Ingram’s
Private
Secretary
on 10 August with a draft note on ISF
capacity‑building.699
He wrote
that,
having read
Lt Gen Brims’ report, Mr Blair had asked for further
advice, giving “greater
clarity on
ISF capacity‑building. Specifically: exploring the detail beneath
headline
numbers;
discussing the delivery of equipment and training; assessing the
Iraqi
command
structure; and an honest assessment of the progress of
Iraqiisation.”
750.
Dr John
Reid became Defence Secretary in May 2005. Dr Reid sent
Mr Cornish’s
note to
Mr Blair on 28 August, advising that “numerically, generation
of ISF remains on
track, but
significant development in key capability areas is still
needed”.700
The
problem
areas
were:
•
the ability
of IMOD forces to direct and sustain independent
operations;
•
equipment
maintenance and effective command and control;
•
IMOD’s
financial management, acquisition and logistics; and
•
IPS’s
progress – its capability thought to be 12 months behind the Iraqi
Army.
751.
Dr Reid
wrote that those issues were being addressed but that “with the
focus on
quantity
rather than quality, this inevitably will take time”. On the
political control of the
ISF by the
Iraqi Government, he stated:
“… the
succession of short term ‘power sharing’ governments has not
created the
conditions
for the generation of coherent policies … Armed militias are a
reality
and cannot
be ignored; both the Kurds and Shia have them and their presence
is
implicit in
the form of local militias to protect businesses mentioned in PM
Ja’afari’s
twelve‑point
security statement. We must beware that the ISF we are creating
does
not migrate
into yet more locally owned militias.”
752.
The IPS
remained “riven with bribery, corruption, intimidation and
politicisation” and
Special
Police Commandos had been “linked to human rights abuses and extra
judicial
killings”.
Dr Reid wrote:
“Across
Iraq, the Rule of Law is hampered by institutional fragility in the
police and
criminal
justice system. Shortcomings in basic infrastructure, equipment,
training and
specialist
capabilities such as forensics continue to limit IPS
performance.”
699
Minute
Cornish to PS/Minister (AF), 10 August 2005, ‘Update on the Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) and the
Process of
Iraqiisation’.
700
Minute Reid
to Blair, 28 August 2005, ‘Update on Progress of the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF)’.
224