The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

substance of public dossier”; Mr Campbell “should retain the lead role on the timing/form

of its release.”174

399. In his statement for the Inquiry, Mr McKane wrote:

“There was a concentration on ensuring that we produced a document which would

make an impact. I therefore had to include as much fresh material as possible.

But throughout the process we were clear that the material had to be factually

accurate and as comprehensive as possible. We drew from a range of sources, both

open and classified, including intelligence material. I relied on the Cabinet Office

Assessments Staff and other representatives of the intelligence community to advise

on the accuracy of the material which they were providing and the benefits and risks

of using intelligence material in a public document.”175

400. Mr McKane told the Inquiry that there was a debate in Whitehall about whether

Iraq represented a greater threat than the other countries, and that “the distinguishing

feature of Iraq was that … they had actually used these weapons”.176 He added that he

was aware of differences of view about whether it was sensible to publish the document

at that stage.

401. Following a discussion with Mr Tony Cragg, Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence,

about a proposed amendment to the paper, a junior official in the DIS recorded that he

had been told on 26 March by a junior official in the Assessments Staff that the latest

plan was for the paper to be issued after a “decent interval” following Mr Blair’s meeting

with President Bush.177 The Assessments Staff official was not sure when that meeting

would take place.

402. The Guardian reported on 1 April that the UK Government had “indefinitely delayed

publishing a dossier revealing damning evidence against Saddam Hussein”, which had

been “trailed by” Mr Campbell.178 It would “now be published when ‘it is believed to be

appropriate’”. The article suggested that No.10 feared publication would add to “fevered

speculation of an imminent strike”, and that “Labour MPs considered the outlines of the

evidence to be unconvincing”.

403. The Guardian also reported that there had been:

“… intense discussions within the intelligence community about what should be

published and how much speculation it should contain.

174 Manuscript comment Rycroft to McKane, 25 March 2002, on Minute Ricketts to Patey, 22 March 2002,

‘Iraq: Preparing Material for Public Release’.

175 Statement, 8 December 2010, page 4.

176 Public hearing, 19 January 2011, page 72.

177 Email AD(GI) WMDP to DI GI PA, 26 March 2002, ‘Public Paper on Iraq’.

178 The Guardian, 1 April 2002, Blair delays Iraq dossier release.

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