Executive
Summary
•
The MOD saw
a significant military contribution as a means of
influencing
US decisions.
•
Mr Blair
and Mr Hoon wanted to keep open the option of contributing
significant
forces for
ground operations as long as possible, but between May
and
mid‑October
consistently pushed back against US assumptions that the
UK
would
provide a division.
•
Air and
maritime forces were offered to the US for planning
purposes
in September.
•
The MOD
advised in October that the UK was at risk of being excluded
from
US plans
unless it offered ground forces, “Package 3”, on the same basis as
air
and
maritime forces. That could also significantly reduce the UK’s
vulnerability
to US
requests to provide a substantial and costly contribution to
post‑conflict
operations.
•
From August
until December 2002, other commitments meant that UK
planning
for Package 3 was based on providing a divisional headquarters
and
an armoured
brigade for operations in northern Iraq. That was seen as
the
maximum
practicable contribution the UK could generate within the
predicted
timescales
for US action.
•
The
deployment was dependent on Turkey’s agreement to the transit
of
UK forces.
•
Mr Blair
agreed to offer Package 3 on 31 October 2002.
•
That
decision and its potential consequences were not formally
considered
by a Cabinet
Committee or reported to Cabinet.
•
In December
2002, the deployment of 3 Commando Brigade was identified
as
a way for
the UK to make a valuable contribution in the initial stages of a
land
campaign if
transit through Turkey was refused. The operational risks were
not
explicitly
addressed.
•
Following a
visit to Turkey on 7 to 8 January 2003, Mr Hoon concluded that
there
would be no
agreement to the deployment of UK ground forces through
Turkey.
•
By that
time, in any case, the US had asked the UK to deploy for
operations
in southern
Iraq.
812.
The following
key findings are from Section 6.2:
•
The
decisions taken between mid‑December 2002 and mid‑January 2003
to
increase
the combat force deployed to three brigades and bring forward
the
date on
which UK forces might participate in combat operations
compressed
the timescales
available for preparation.
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