The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
could not
guarantee that the mentoring of police was done “to the depth, to
the degree,
to the
duration that it had to be”.762
That meant
that he had to “fill that gap using soldiers
and
military police so that instead of partnering my military forces
with Iraqi military forces
only, which
would have been the ideal situation, I also had to partner them
closely in many
cases with
the Iraqi police to fill that void”.
Lt
Gen Riley said that he had discussed that difficulty with
colleagues many times but the
rules for
civilian personnel were fixed; “So it became a given”.
The
arrangements for civilian personnel are described in Section
15.1.
808.
On 18 August
2004, a Current Intelligence Group (CIG) Assessment
stated:
“Little is
being done in Basra by the security forces to stop a minority of
Mahdi Army
militants
causing disruption. The police chief is in league with the
militants and
elements of
the Iraqi police were involved in the kidnapping of the British
journalist
[Mr James
Brandon, subsequently released – see Section 9.3]. A report
suggests
the Amara
police chief has agreed not to interfere in the activities of the
Mahdi Army
in the
city, but this is due to police concern at their own vulnerability
rather than
809.
In his letter
to Mr Fergusson on 20 August (as detailed earlier in this
Section),
Mr Phillipson
wrote that the Prime Minister considered “problems with the police
chief
in Basra”
as one of the “real risk[s] to our objectives”.764
810.
The IPU’s
paper entitled “Iraq: Next Steps”, produced on 27 August, stated
that the
Chief of
Police in Basra was “co‑operating with the Sadrists” but did not
suggest a way
of
addressing that, or of addressing the issue of divided loyalties
more widely.765
811.
Two days later
Mr Blair produced a minute to No.10 staff which
stated:
“… we
cannot have a situation as in Basra where the police chief is
working with
812.
On 3
September, the CIG reported that a senior Badr organisation
official had been
appointed
as Basra Governor and that he intended to remove the Basra Police
Chief.767
813.
On 11
November, the JIC reported that the Police Chief had been
“sacked”.768
762
Public
hearing, 14 December 2009, pages 25‑26.
763
CIG
Assessment, 18 August 2004, ‘Iraq Security’.
764
Letter
Phillipson to Fergusson, 20 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next
Steps’.
765
Minute
Crompton to Private Secretary [FCO], 27 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next
Steps’ attaching Paper Iraq
Policy
Unit, 27 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next Steps: Action
Points’.
766
Minute
Prime Minister to Sheinwald, Powell and Phillipson, 29 August 2004,
‘Iraq’.
767
CIG
Assessment, 3 September 2004, ‘Iraq Security: Shia Violence in
Multi‑National Division (South East)’.
768
JIC
Assessment, 11 November 2004, ‘Iraq Security – Current
Concerns’.
240