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Executive Summary
This was also troubling my military. We had all sorts of contingency plans in place ...
There was both UK and US intelligence warning us of the risk.
“Nonetheless I thought it was worth a try ...”
234.  Mr Blair also wrote:
“Chile and Mexico were prepared to go along, but only up to a point. Ricardo made
it clear that if there was heavy opposition from France, it would be tough for them to
participate in what would then be a token vote, incapable of being passed because
of a veto – and what’s more, a veto not by Russia, but by France.
“Unfortunately, the French position had, if anything, got harder not softer. They were
starting to say they would not support military action in any circumstances,
irrespective of what the inspectors found ...”
235.  In a press conference on 10 March, Mr Annan reiterated the Security Council’s
determination to disarm Iraq, but said that every avenue for a peaceful resolution of the
crisis had to be exhausted before force should be used.109
236.  Mr Annan also warned that, if the Security Council failed to agree on a common
position and action was taken without the authority of the Council, the legitimacy and
support for any such action would be seriously impaired.
237.  In an interview on 10 March, President Chirac stated that it was for the inspectors
to advise whether they could complete their task.110 If they reported that they were not
in a position to guarantee Iraq’s disarmament, it would be:
“... for the Security Council alone to decide the right thing to do. But in that case ...
regrettably, the war would become inevitable. It isn’t today.”
238.  President Chirac stated that he did not consider that the draft resolution tabled by
the US, UK and Spain would attract support from nine members of the Security Council.
In that case, there would be no majority for action, “So there won’t be a veto problem.”
239.  But if there were a majority “in favour of the new resolution”, France would
“vote ‘no’”.
240.  In response to a question asking, “And, this evening, this is your position in
principle?”, President Chirac responded:
“My position is that, regardless of the circumstances, France will vote ‘no’ because
she considers this evening that there are no grounds for waging war in order to
achieve the goal we have set ourselves, that is to disarm Iraq.”
109 United Nations, 10 March 2003, Secretary‑General’s press conference (unofficial transcript).
110 The Élysée, Interview télévisée de Jacques Chirac, le 10 mars 2003. A translation for HMG was
produced in a Note, [unattributed and undated], ‘Iraq – Interview given by M. Jacques Chirac, President
of the Republic, to French TV (10 March 2003)’.
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