6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
890.
In January
2003, a US National Intelligence Community Assessment had
judged
that a
post-Saddam Hussein authority in Iraq would face “a deeply divided
society with a
significant
chance that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict with
each other
unless an
occupying force prevented them from doing so”.372
The
Assessment identified
three
divisions:
•
The
“principal division” between Sunni Arabs, the Shia and the Kurds.
Based
on
ethnicity and religion, it also had a geographical aspect, with the
groups
concentrated
in the central, southern and northern regions of Iraq
respectively.
•
Divisions
between “tribal identities”. Although 75 per cent of Iraqis
identified
with a
tribe, many of those would be urban residents who probably felt
little
allegiance
to their tribal leaders. Many Iraqi tribes were associated with
Saddam
Hussein,
although for most this was based on self-interest and they could
be
expected to
seek accommodation with any successor regime.
•
Divisions
between those associated with Saddam Hussein’s regime and
its
victims.
891.
A March 2003
CIA report on the Iraqi police and judiciary provided a
general
description
of both, but highlighted the lack of information held by the US on
local level
officials,
including their identities, loyalties and involvement in human
rights abuses
under
Saddam Hussein’s regime.373
The issue
had been a lower intelligence collection
priority
than Iraqi WMD, conventional military capabilities and leadership
dynamics.
892.
DFID
produced an outline ‘Humanitarian Strategy and Immediate
Assistance
Plan’ for
Iraq on 12 March.
893.
The paper,
prepared for Ms Short, was a statement of DFID’s, rather than
the
UK’s,
priorities. It sought to retain “maximum operational flexibility”
for DFID in
the face of
continuing uncertainty and limited resources.
894.
On 12 March,
DFID officials sent Ms Short DFID’s outline ‘Humanitarian
Strategy
and
Immediate Assistance Plan’ for Iraq.374
The
covering minute explained that the
strategy
aimed to address DFID’s key objectives of “saving lives and
relieving the
suffering
of the Iraqi people whilst adhering to our principles of impartial
humanitarian
response.
In view of the uncertainties and our limited resources, we are
planning to
retain the
maximum operational flexibility.”
372
US Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on
prewar intelligence assessments about post-
war
Iraq, 25 May
2007.
373
US Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on
prewar intelligence assessments about post-
war
Iraq, 25 May
2007.
374
Minute
Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department [junior official], 12
March 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian
Strategy
and Immediate Assistance Plan: Information Note’.
473