3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
fail to
appreciate that its very survival depended on full compliance, and
that this
would be
relatively straightforward for them to prove – unless they had
something
terrifying
to hide. In the event, however, my optimism proved
unfounded.”
399.
Asked to
explain the basis for his optimism, Mr Straw responded in his
statement
for the
Inquiry in January 2011 that:
“… a key
foundation … was that the United States had committed itself to
dealing
with Saddam
by working through the United Nations …
“This was
coupled to emerging evidence that, while by no means sufficiently,
the
inspectors
were beginning to make some progress …
“Additionally,
there were indications from the United States that it was moving
closer
to
committing itself to going for a second resolution. My optimism at
the time was
therefore
also in part based on the hope of a unified Security Council
position, in
the form of
a second resolution. I believed at the time, and I still believe
today, that
confronting
Saddam Hussein with this clear united position from the
international
community …
would have presented us with the best way to deal with
Iraq
400.
Mr Straw
confirmed that he was aware that Mr Blair was more sceptical
than he
was, but in
early 2003 his instinct was more optimistic that there would be
compliance.141
401.
Mr Straw
wrote in his memoir that he “wanted to pull back on the idea of a
‘rush
to war’ and
in particular avoid Hans Blix’s next report, due on 27 January,
being the
decisive
moment”. At the beginning of 2003, he was “optimistic about a
peaceful
resolution”
and, when he had been asked about “the odds of avoiding war” by
journalists
from
The
Times and
the Sun
on 3
January, he had replied “Sixty/forty”.142
402.
Sir David
Manning advised Mr Blair that the US was close to giving up
hope
on the UN
route and that President Bush was in danger of being driven by
the
tempo of
his own military build‑up.
403.
The UK
should continue to seek to persuade the US that more time
was
needed to
build the case against Saddam Hussein and improve the odds
for
a second
resolution.
404.
Sir David
Manning provided a note for Mr Blair’s return to office on 4
January,
which
stated that there had been “no major developments while you have
been away.
But we need
to focus hard on inspections, and military planning in the next few
days.”143
140
Statement,
19 January 2011, paragraphs 4.1‑4.6.
141
Public
hearing, 2 February 2011, pages 79‑80.
142
Straw
J. Last Man
Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor. Macmillan,
2012.
143
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 3 January 2003, ‘Iraq’.
73