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3.3  |  Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002
The US “understood – and even seemed to accept – the Foreign Secretary’s
point that regime change should not be an objective in its own right but a point
on a path to a stable Iraq”.
A Department of Defense (DoD) official said that “no one in Washington now
thought that replacement of Saddam by another military strong man now
made sense: the US would end up being responsible for his actions even
if he went wrong on them”. The official was looking more to a government
which “represented a wide range of tribal groups”, while acknowledging that
democracy would be unlikely. Mr Webb commented that this “does not … chime”
with the views of others in the US.
The US “clearly envisage remaining in Iraq for some time” but had taken
Mr Webb’s point that “permanent basing would create an adverse reaction in
the region”.
Momentum in Washington had “flagged” since his last conversations in February;
US resolve was “unabated” but “the sense was more sine die than poised”.
92.  Mr Webb’s discussion of the possible scale and timing for any UK military
contribution is addressed in Section 6.1
93.  Mr Hoon informed Mr Blair on 31 May that he and Mr Straw had agreed a
“preliminary objective” to guide work on contingency planning for military operations of:
“A stable and law-abiding Iraq, within its present borders, co-operating with
the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to
international security, abiding by its obligations on WMD.”47
94.  Sir Peter Ricketts told the Inquiry that it was “hard to imagine that an Iraq
[as envisaged in the objective] … would still have Saddam Hussein in charge”.48
Meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld, 5 June 2002
95.  In preparation for a visit to the UK by Mr Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary
of Defense, on 5 June, Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Blair on 31 May.
96.  UK contingency planning had concluded that, for the UK to have influence on
US planning, a significant military contribution would be needed. This was defined
as at “division level” for land forces.
97.  To take planning further, greater clarity on US thinking was needed.
98.  Mr Hoon also identified that exposing the constraints on the UK’s ability to
contribute forces before the end of 2002 could reduce its influence.
47  Minute Hoon to Prime Minister, 31 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.
48  Public hearing, 1 December 2009, pages 20-21.
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