3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
•
The US
“understood – and even seemed to accept – the Foreign
Secretary’s
point that
regime change should not be an objective in its own right but a
point
on a path
to a stable Iraq”.
•
A
Department of Defense (DoD) official said that “no one in
Washington now
thought
that replacement of Saddam by another military strong man
now
made sense:
the US would end up being responsible for his actions
even
if he went
wrong on them”. The official was looking more to a
government
which
“represented a wide range of tribal groups”, while acknowledging
that
democracy
would be unlikely. Mr Webb commented that this “does not …
chime”
with the
views of others in the US.
•
The US
“clearly envisage remaining in Iraq for some time” but had
taken
Mr Webb’s
point that “permanent basing would create an adverse reaction
in
the region”.
•
Momentum in
Washington had “flagged” since his last conversations in
February;
US resolve
was “unabated” but “the sense was more sine
die than
poised”.
92.
Mr Webb’s
discussion of the possible scale and timing for any UK
military
contribution
is addressed in Section 6.1
93.
Mr Hoon
informed Mr Blair on 31 May that he and Mr Straw had agreed
a
“preliminary
objective” to guide work on contingency planning for military
operations of:
“A stable
and law-abiding Iraq, within its present borders, co-operating
with
the
international community, no longer posing a threat to its
neighbours or to
international
security, abiding by its obligations on WMD.”47
94.
Sir Peter
Ricketts told the Inquiry that it was “hard to imagine that an
Iraq
[as envisaged
in the objective] … would still have Saddam Hussein in
charge”.48
95.
In
preparation for a visit to the UK by Mr Donald Rumsfeld, the US
Secretary
of Defense,
on 5 June, Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Blair on 31 May.
96.
UK
contingency planning had concluded that, for the UK to have
influence on
US
planning, a significant military contribution would be needed. This
was defined
as at
“division level” for land forces.
97.
To take
planning further, greater clarity on US thinking was
needed.
98.
Mr Hoon
also identified that exposing the constraints on the UK’s ability
to
contribute
forces before the end of 2002 could reduce its
influence.
47
Minute Hoon
to Prime Minister, 31 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.
48
Public
hearing, 1 December 2009, pages 20-21.
21