The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
civilian
teams … could form the basis for the [PRT] teams, together
with the
DFID‑funded
single Public Administration Adviser per province.”
438.
DFID briefing
for Mr Benn for the DOP(I) meeting stated:
“We and MOD
are both concerned about the risks of this approach. It is
expensive,
will divert
funding from other priorities, and we do not believe it will make a
dramatic
difference
in outcomes. It may slow military transition … The agreed
Whitehall
approach is
that we will be constructive; find out more and try and influence
the US
approach;
and that we will repackage our effort in the South as a PRT but not
do
very much
differently.” 249
439.
At DOP(I),
Ministers commented that PRTs should be tailored to their
environment,
and that
Iraqi ownership and the involvement of international donors were
essential.250
440.
The British
Embassy Baghdad reported on 8 November that the US
Embassy
was happy
to allow the UK time to develop its own ideas for PRTs in the
South, and
to be fully
engaged in planning.251
The strong
preference of the US, however, was for
individual
PRTs to be established in each of the four southern provinces (in
line with the
US approach
in the rest of Iraq). The Embassy had argued that the UK would need
to
take
account of existing governance arrangements in the South, and the
effect of PRTs
on the
transfer of security responsibility.
441.
An MOD
briefing for Gen Walker described that effect:
“The [US]
proposal sees the establishment of a … PRT in every Province for at
least
two years.
This would almost certainly undermine MND(SE) transition plans,
with
a
significant risk that UK forces would be fixed in Maysan and
Muthanna into the
442.
Dr Rice
inaugurated the first PRT in Iraq on 11 November during a visit to
Mosul.253
443.
Dr Reid told
the 15 November meeting of DOP(I) that the UK’s exit from
Muthanna
and Maysan
had been delayed from February until May 2006, reflecting the
UK’s
commitment
to the Japanese.254
Dr Reid
hoped it would be possible to complete the
handover
within this timescale in order to start reducing the UK’s troop
commitment in
Iraq during
2006.
249
Minute DFID
[junior official] to Private Secretary [DFID], 1 November 2005,
‘Iraq: Oral Briefing in
Preparation
for DOP(I), 3 November’.
250
Minutes, 3
November 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
251
eGram
17627/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 8 November 2005, ‘Iraq: Provincial
Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs)’.
252
Minute
DCJO(Ops) to PSO/CDS, 14 November 2005, ‘Provincial Reconstruction
Teams in MND(SE) –
Implementation’.
253
US
Institute of Peace, 20 March 2013, Provincial
Reconstruction Teams in Iraq.
254
Minutes, 15
November 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
270