The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

526. Lt Gen Reith advised that there were already signs that previous assumptions

about the nature and duration of the conflict might have been wrong. Phase IV(a)

now looked likely to be far shorter than previously expected, while the arrival of other

Coalition partners and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) looked like taking

longer. All this added pressure. Lt Gen Reith listed a number of issues needing

resolution, pointing out that some were already well known. They included: the system

of governance under Phase IV(b); how to approach Security Sector Reform (SSR);

provision of salaries to Iraqis; and how to engage the Iraqi military and judiciary.

527. On “military realities”, Lt Gen Reith stated: “The Coalition must be prepared for

high/medium/low consent and variations thereof in time and space, including asymmetric

attack and intra-factional violence.” He listed “How to deal with non-compliance” as one

of the “key issues requiring resolution”.

528. The draft Operational Concept for Phase IV prepared by Lt Gen Reith on

25 March:

• provided broad estimates of force requirements based on an expectation

of growing popular consent in the South;

• anticipated that the US would ask the UK to assume responsibility for four

provinces;

• cautioned that growing consent was dependent on a number of factors,

including improvement to the quality of life for Iraqis;

• highlighted the critical importance of an authorising Security Council

resolution and early bilateral UK engagement with potential force

contributors;

• advised the Chiefs of Staff to balance the military’s “intention to draw

down to below medium scale as rapidly as possible” against the UK’s

“wider political objectives”; and

• advised that agreement with the US on a UK AOR “would allow planning

for Phase IV to be taken forward in confidence”.

529. On 25 March, two UK military planning papers for Phase IV were sent to the Chiefs

of Staff: a draft Operational Concept and draft Phase IV military planning guidance.

530. The draft Operational Concept for Phase IV, submitted by Lt Gen Reith, stated that:

“An enduring, operational level, concept is required to provide clarity and direction

in a situation which is presently ill-defined and which could develop in a number

of ways.” 331

331 Minute Reith to COSSEC, 25 March 2003, ‘Draft Operational Concept’ attaching Paper Reith,

25 March 2003, ‘Operation TELIC, Phase IV, The Joint Commander’s Draft Operational Concept’.

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