The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Ridgback and the Snatch vehicle would continue to be modified, although, as with any

vehicle, it could never be made “invulnerable”.

794.  The latest variant, the Snatch Vixen,417 had been especially configured for

Afghanistan, and the MOD had “already fielded a small number of these vehicles”.

795.  On 7 November, Lt Gen Houghton advised Sir Jock Stirrup on “an urgent review

of the impact of limiting the use of all variants of Snatch Land Rover”.418 The advice

suggested that Lt Gen Houghton had issued separate, earlier advice in July to Sir Jock

following the meeting with Mr Browne on 25 June and the 7 November advice was

because he had been asked again to consider the impact of limiting the use of all

variants of Snatch in Iraq and Afghanistan.

796.  Lt Gen Houghton wrote that the justification for retaining Snatch had not changed

since his previous advice in July; Snatch vehicles remained “mission critical” in both

theatres due to their profile, manoeuvrability and carrying capacity.

797.  Lt Gen Houghton said that limiting the use of Snatch outside secure bases in

Iraq would have a “significant impact” on operations by reducing patrols’ situational

awareness and restricting movements.

798.  The “interim solution” of Snatch Vixen in Afghanistan had “started to deliver”.

DEC(GM) was “working towards a final solution” but there was no light PPV “on the

market that could be delivered within a year”. The Ridgback and Mastiff programmes

for Afghanistan had been delayed and were not now likely to be delivered until the

beginning of 2009.

799.  Lt Gen Houghton added:

“Given the wider political and media sensitivity, however, we should maintain our

intent to deliver the planned SN2A [Snatch 2A variant currently in use] replacement

as quickly as possible, increase the numbers of PM [Protected Mobility] vehicles

in UORs and conduct rapid work on operational solutions to remove SN2A from

outside secure bases as quickly as possible. SN3‑Vixen would appear to be the

fastest way of achieving this.”

800.  Major General Andrew Salmon, GOC MND(SE) from August 2008 to March 2009,

told the Inquiry that, when he arrived in Iraq, “security was getting better”.419 The number

of rocket attacks “was down to about four or five a month”, compared with over 200 a

month before the Charge of the Knights (see Section 12.1). There were still IEDs set on

roads but “the level of violence had much reduced”.

417  Referred to in some MOD papers as Snatch 3‑Vixen.

418  Note CJO to PSO/CDS, 7 November 2008, ‘Limiting the Deployment of Snatch Outside Secure Bases’.

419  Public hearing, 20 July 2010, page 6.

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