3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
on
substance would be bound to negate the case for the UK’s
involvement
in military action.”
510.
Secretary
Powell was reported to have responded that he understood
that:
“… but he
was not sure that was where President Bush was. He might still
be
inclined to
‘go it alone’ for the removal of Saddam and the President believed
that
the Prime
Minister would commit British troops in any event.”
511.
Mr Straw
said that Mr Blair’s “personal loyalty to the President was
never in doubt;
but that
alone would not answer the question whether there was adequate
legal and
political
justification for UK military involvement”.
512.
In response to
Secretary Powell’s comment that he assumed the
demonstration
on 15
February made a second resolution “even more necessary”,
Mr Straw replied:
“… yes. If
there were nine votes or more in the Security Council for a
second
resolution,
and this majority was subject to a veto by one only of the P5, I
thought
we could
carry the day in the Commons and the country but there would
have
to
be … clear evidence of substantive non-compliance by Iraq of
1441. Without
the latter,
we could have no chance. Regime change per se had never been
the
objective
of HMG’s strategy however desirable it was.”
513.
Mr Straw
added that:
“… even
with a second resolution (or a majority and a veto but good case)
the
political
and public order consequences of the early stages of military
action on
current
plans would be hard to handle: without a very strong case,
consistent with
our clear,
already stated objectives, they could become unmanageable. Unless
we
were very
lucky, military action without an effective international consensus
could
severely
damage US as well as UK interests.”
514.
In a
discussion of the timing for a second resolution, Mr Powell
said he was still
thinking
about tabling a resolution that week but stating that a vote was
not being asked
for
immediately. Mr Straw pointed out the disadvantages for the UK
while Parliament
was in
recess, adding that tabling a resolution without any commitment for
an early vote
would be
seen as a sign of weakness. It might also make it harder to secure
the votes
of the
elected members of the Council. It might also be seen as ignoring
the outcome
of the
inspectors’ reports on 28 February.
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