The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Ms Lindy
Cameron, the Head of DFID Baghdad, commented on the report that
while Najaf
was not
typical of “problem cities”:
“Nevertheless,
it demonstrates the importance of having in place a clear
strategy
for
immediate post-conflict support so that the military can help
civilian authorities
get instant
access to funds, take immediate action, get essential services
running
and put
money into the local economy, starting a virtuous circle leading in
the
longer‑term
(as in Najaf) to a conducive environment for large infrastructure
projects,
re‑establishment
of normal market mechanisms and a benign force
profile.”
There are
no indications that Mr Blair or Ministers saw the
report.
165.
Section 10.3
describes the UK Government’s role in negotiations towards a
deal
to reduce
Iraq’s debt.
166.
On 24
September, as part of those negotiations, the Iraqi Government
undertook
to begin to
reduce fuel subsidies by the end of the year, and to raise prices
to “cost
recovery
levels” by the end of 2009.95
167.
On 21
November, Paris Club creditors agreed to reduce Iraq’s official
debt by
80 percent
(a reduction of US$31.1bn).96
The deal
would be delivered in three stages:
30 percent
immediately; 30 percent on IMF approval of a Stand-By
Arrangement
(expected
to be in 2005); and 20 percent on completion of the Stand-By
Arrangement
(in 2008).
Paris Club creditors also agreed generous terms for the repayment
of the
residual
debt.
168.
Under the
agreement, the UK wrote off US$1.39bn (£954m) in Iraqi
debt
(£337m in UK
financial year 2004/05, £337m in 2005/06 and £280m in
2008/09).97
169.
A Treasury
briefing produced for Mr Brown stated that the deal
represented an
important
success for the international community, demonstrating an ability
to act
together on
an issue as divisive as Iraq.98
170.
Section 9.3
describes the UK’s continuing efforts to support the political
process in
Iraq, and
in particular ensuring that elections could take place on schedule
at the end of
January
2005.
95
IMF Staff
Report, September 2004, Iraq: Use
of Funds – Request for Emergency Post-Conflict
Assistance.
96
Briefing
Treasury, [undated], ‘Brief: Meeting with Barham Saleh, Deputy
Prime Minister of Iraq’
97
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Aldred, 13 September 2011,
‘Iraq Inquiry: Request for Further
Information
on Funding’.
98
Briefing
Treasury, [undated], ‘Brief: Meeting with Barham Saleh, Deputy
Prime Minister of Iraq’.
224