The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
732.
The offer
of Package 2 was not enough to address growing MOD
concerns
that the
caveats on Package 3 were leading the US to discount the
contribution
in its
planning, closing off the option for UK ground forces to
participate in the
combat
phase.
733.
Concerns
were expressed at the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 2
October
about the
risk of irreparable damage to US/UK relations as a result of
continuing
uncertainty
about a UK land contribution.
734.
Adm Boyce
was clear that should not be allowed to happen.
735.
The UK’s
involvement post‑conflict might be more onerous than
war‑fighting.
736.
Elements of
the “Force on Mind” strategy were still being
discussed.
737.
On 30
September, Lt Gen Reith provided an “illustrative
critical decision and event
matrix on
timings”, to provide a critical path for deploying Packages 2 and
3.299
Timings
within the
matrix were “illustrative only”. That included:
•
decisions
in the week beginning 7 October to begin the UOR process for
priority
equipments,
nomination of a National Contingent Commander (NCC), and
a
decision on
UK participation in Exercise Internal Look;300
•
beginning
overt preparations, including call‑up of Reserves, by the end
of
October;
and
•
deploying
the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and beginning
pre‑deployment
training
for the land component by the end of November.
738.
Lt Gen Reith
advised that the timelines assumed a US Presidential decision,
on
whether to
take military action, on 6 January 2003. He also stated that it was
anticipated
that UN
inspectors would begin work in mid‑December, and were required to
submit
an initial
report two months later. That “could offer the US a trigger to
begin operations”
which
“could come forward” if a “strongly worded” resolution was
adopted.
739.
Lt Gen Reith
separately sought endorsement of the command and control
(C2)
arrangements
for potential operations in Iraq and the nomination of the
individuals
who would
potentially fill key posts in time for them to participate in
Exercise Internal
Look.301
That
included the identification of the UK NCC, who would be collocated
with
CENTCOM’s
Forward HQ in Qatar.
299
Minute
Reith to MA/DCDS(C), 30 September 2002, ‘Planning for Iraq –
Critical Decision and Event
Matrix’.
300
Internal
Look was a CENTCOM exercise planned for December 2002 which would
be a mission
rehearsal
for possible future military operations against Iraq.
301
Minute
Reith to DCDS(C), 30 September 2002, ‘Warrior Command and Control
Architecture and
Preparations
for Exercise Internal Look’.
286