The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Sometimes
and in particular dealing with a dictator, the only chance for
peace
is a readiness
for war.”
284.
Mr Blair
also set out his goals for the Middle East Peace
Process:
“By this
year’s end, we must have revived final status negotiations and they
must
have
explicitly as their aims: an Israeli state free from terror,
recognised by the Arab
World and a
viable Palestinian state based on the boundaries of
1967.”
285.
Mr Blair
added that “to help shape” that new world, the UK needed to be part
of it.
That meant
making the most of both the UK’s friendship with the US and its
membership
of Europe.
In five years in government he had learnt that:
•
“the
radical decision is the right one”;
•
the “right
decision is usually the hardest one”; and
•
“the
hardest decisions are often the least popular at the
time”.
The
“starting point” was not policy, it was “hope”.
286.
Public
opinion in the US was supportive of President Bush’s
position.
287.
In early
October, the US Administration was also negotiating the terms of
a
bipartisan
resolution to be tabled in Congress.
288.
Sir
Christopher Meyer reported that “the points of disagreement [were]
relatively
narrow: no
one doubts that inspections will fail, the argument is how hard to
try for
international
support for the war that will ensue”.98
289.
A draft
circulated by the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(Senator
Biden) and
his Republican counterpart (Senator Lugar) required the President
to certify
before
using force against Iraq that he had attempted to seek UN approval
for action,
and
provided for regular updates to Congress on how far allies were
assisting the
military
effort. It also focused on the WMD threat as the basis for action
rather than the
wider
failings of the Iraqi regime.
290.
Sir
Christopher reported that the White House was taking an
“uncompromising
approach”
and had rejected that text.
291.
Sir
Christopher assessed that the Administration was in a strong
position, with at
least 70
out of 100 votes for military action in the Senate and a Democrat
leadership
which did
not want to fight the November mid‑term elections by challenging
President
Bush on
national security.
98
Telegram
1263 Washington to FCO London, 1 October 2002, ‘Iraq: US
Congressional and
Public Opinion’.
252