8 | The
invasion
505.
Adm Boyce’s
Execute Directive, issued on 18 March and addressed in
detail
earlier in
this Section, directed Lt Gen Reith to “assume the UK Phase IV AO
will be
506.
In line with
the military plan approved by Mr Blair on 14 March, the
Directive stated
that, to
“assist the Coalition in a timely and successful Phase III and to
help in shaping
Phase IV
conditions in the UK AO”, Lt Gen Reith should exploit no further
north than
an east –
west line running 90km south of al-Kut, ending at a point 50km
north-east
of al‑Amara.
507.
The Directive
also stated that it was Adm Boyce’s “current intent … that the
UK
should aim
to draw down its deployed force to medium scale within four months
of
commencing
offensive operations”.
508.
Mr Hoon
and Mr Straw sent Mr Blair a joint minute on the UK
military contribution
to
post-conflict Iraq on 19 March.325
It stated
that, immediately after the invasion:
“The
expectation is that UK forces would be responsible for a task
focused on
Basra and
other key military objectives in the south-east of Iraq, which
could include
20 percent
of the Iraqi population. This task is broadly proportionate to the
size of
the UK’s
contribution to overall Coalition land forces …”
509.
Mr Straw
and Mr Hoon also advised that it would be necessary to reduce
the
UK military
contribution “to nearer a third by no later than the autumn in
order to avoid
long-term
damage to the Armed Forces” and to remain within current defence
planning
assumptions.
Scaling down to nearer a third would limit the UK contribution
thereafter
to “a
maximum of around one brigade, a two-star [divisional] headquarters
and possibly
a
contribution to higher level command and control”. They recommended
telling the US
now, for
planning purposes, that this was the upper limit of the UK
contribution.
510.
The joint
minute and the subsequent discussion and correspondence
are
described
in more detail in Section 6.5. This Section identifies only the
high level points
in relation
to possible UK command of a military sector.
324
Minute CDS
to CJO, 18 March 2003, ‘Op TELIC: Authorisation for Military
Operations in Iraq’ attaching
Paper CDS,
‘Chief of Defence Staff Execute Directive to the Joint Commander
for Operation TELIC
(Phases 3
and 4)’.
325
Minute
Straw and Hoon to Prime Minister, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Contribution to
post‑conflict Iraq’.
91