The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
presentation
[on 5 February 2003]. This is in response to a request from
the
House
[of Representatives] Intelligence Committee. Congressional
Committees
do not normally
have access to raw intelligence, but they have done
occasionally
in the
past: […]”
242.
Mr Campbell
recorded in his diaries that he had spoken to Mr Powell on
3 June
and:
“… agreed a
way forward was for the ISC to trail an inquiry before T[ony]
B[lair]
formally
announced it and John S[carlett] to make clear nothing improper
took place.”139
243.
Mr Campbell
also sent Mr Blair a note advising that Parliamentary debates
on Iraq
on
4 June were :
“… about
both the substance of the issue and the manner in which you deal
with it.
The overall
aim must be to give explanation and context, calm the frenzy, and
regain
support for
our basic position …”140
244.
In relation to
the substance, Mr Campbell wrote:
“… the
current frenzy flows from the fact that apart from the two mobile
labs nothing
new has
been found … so tomorrow is in part about saying as much as you
can
about the
process towards discovery … The fact there are other more
pressing
issues –
security, humanitarian, basic services – is relevant …
“What
reasonable MPs will want is a signal that you understand the nature
of the
concern.
We’ve had a week essentially of saying people are being ridiculous
… but it
won’t go
away … [A]s WMD was the stated reason for war, people want to know
the
full story,
and that you set out the process as to how they’re going to get
it.”
“The second
issue relates to the intelligence services, and in particular the
false
charge that
we wrongly used intelligence material, or asked the Agencies to
do
something
they should not have, or that they were not happy with … [T]he
media,
particularly
the BBC, are
trying to create a ‘no smoke without fire’
atmosphere.”
246.
Mr Campbell
wrote that the views of Mr Scarlett and others “that nothing
improper
took place
– should be made public forcefully”. He recommended
Mr Blair:
“… say
that, in the light of the controversy, you asked the JIC to set out
for you
a detailed
analysis of the dossier from inception to publication, and as
result not
only you,
but more importantly the JIC, are 100 percent clear that nothing
wrong
took
place.”
139
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
140
Minute
Campbell to Prime Minister, 3 June 2003,
‘WMD/Tomorrow’.
472