1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
371.
Russia could
not understand why there was “no mention of the IAEA report”
and
the
significant progress on the Iraqi nuclear dossier, which could be
“viewed as closed”.
Mr Lavrov
stated:
“The
sponsors’ categorical refusal to refer to the IAEA report in the
draft resolution
raises most
serious questions and is unacceptable to us.”
372.
Mr Lavrov
also pointed out that resolution 1115 had required
“substantial
compliance”
by Iraq with UNSCOM’s requirements for access; and that continued
in
effect. The
new resolution’s requirements would “confuse the criteria” for
compliance
with the
UN’s resolutions.
373.
Mr Lavrov
concluded that Russia had been “prepared to continue working on
the
draft in
order to make it more balanced and acceptable to all members of the
Security
Council”,
but the sponsors were “unfortunately” not ready to do so. Russia
was “forced
to
abstain”.
374.
Mr Alain
Dejammet, French Permanent Representative to the UN, stated
that
France had
abstained “on a consideration of the merits of the text of the
resolution” and
the
importance of the principle of “seeking unity within the Council”,
both to “underline
the
authority” of UNSCOM’s actions and because France considered that
unity had
“contributed
to the achievement of the significant progress” noted in UNSCOM’s
report.
France also
thought that Mr Butler “should have received some
encouragement,
however
modest, to continue with his efforts and enhance further the
effectiveness
of the Special
Commission’s co-operation with Iraq”.
375.
Iraqi concerns
about US intentions, and its decision to refuse US
participation
in UNSCOM
activities in Iraq, were set out in a letter to the UN on
29 October.
376.
Reflecting the
concerns about US intentions and actions, set out in his
letters
of
15 June and 12 October, and the effect of resolution
1134, which clearly reflected
the
“arbitrary position imposed by the United States against Iraq,
using pressure and
blackmail”,
Mr Aziz informed the President of the Security Council that
Iraq had decided
to continue
co-operation with UNSCOM:
“… provided
no individuals of American nationality shall participate in
any
activity …
inside Iraq, particularly inspections, interviews, and aerial and
ground
146
UN Security
Council, 29 October 1997, ‘Letter dated 29 October 1997
from Mr Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime
Minister of
Iraq, addressed to the President of the Security Council’
(S/1997/829).
91