The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
492.
A concluding
paragraph in the Executive Summary, stating that Saddam
Hussein
would “use
his weapons of mass destruction to protect and eventually project
his power”,
reflected a
revised Conclusions section at the end of the paper which
stated:
“Four
themes dominate even the most sober account of Saddam Hussein’s
rule
in Iraq:
•
Brutality …
against his own people,
•
Aggression
against neighbour states,
•
Cynicism in
dealing with the Iraqi people, regional states and the
International
Community; and,
•
Single minded
pursuit of military power and above all weapons of
mass
destruction
as the most effective means of exercising that power.
“This paper
has set out our assessment of Saddam’s current holdings … as well
as
his
programmes for their development. Although our knowledge is
partial, the paper
concludes
that he possesses mass destruction weapons and the means to
produce
them and to
deliver them. His development programmes continue. An analysis
of
what he
will do with these weapons now and in the future, must rest upon
his record
and our
current information, including intelligence. It is reasonable to
conclude that
he will use
whatever weaponry he has to hand to protect his power and
eventually
to project
it when he feels strong enough to do so.”
493.
Other changes
included:
•
the firming
up of the judgement on the timeline for deploying chemical
and
biological
weapons, from “may be able” to deploy within 45 minutes to “are
able”;
•
the
addition of a statement that Iraq had learned lessons from its
previous
experience
with inspections to identify and exploit weak points and that
sensitive
equipment
and papers were easily concealed;
•
the
addition of a statement that the “possession of mobile biological
agent
production
facilities” would “also aid concealment efforts”; and
•
the
omission of the box explaining the difficulties of producing a
nuclear weapon
and the
inclusion of one which described the elements of a nuclear
programme
and the
process to convert those elements into a reliable weapon. The
only
comment on
the difficulty was that the complexity was “much greater for
a
weapon that
can fit into a missile warhead than for a larger
Nagasaki-type
[free fall]
bomb”.
494.
In an email to
Mr Scarlett, Mr Campbell commented that he did not think
the
revised
Conclusion worked and that he would “either revert to, and
strengthen” the
previous
format (a box summarising key points), or drop the
section.245
Mr Campbell
also wrote
that the Foreword covered most of the points made in the
Conclusion.
245
Email
Campbell to Scarlett, 19 September 2002, [untitled].
206