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12.1  |  Security Sector Reform
11.  A later version of the paper, provided to the AHGI on 11 October, contained an
additional recommendation that:
“… the US and Coalition partners would need to retain overall responsibility for
Iraq’s security for some time after the conflict. How the different security‑related
tasks (including Security Sector Reform) should be carried out and by whom needs
further consideration.”9
12.  The record of the 11 October AHGI meeting did not mention SSR.10 A document
describing “contingency planning work” circulated alongside it recorded that the FCO
was drafting a paper on the topic.
13.  During October and November 2002, the FCO produced several drafts of a paper
on SSR.11 An early version, forwarded to the Cabinet Office on 18 October, listed a range
of post‑conflict security issues that would need to be addressed in Iraq, including:
What security structures would be appropriate for a post S[addam] H[ussein]
Iraqi Government? How do we arrive at an answer? What are the threats,
internal and external? Should we undertake a comprehensive review of the
armed forces?
To what extent do the size, task and organisation of the new security structures
depend on whether Iraq develops into a federation?
To what extent should the Kurds be integrated into the national structures? How
might this be achieved?
How do we replace an excessively large security apparatus with something ‘right
sized’? Reform or abolition? Which parts of the security apparatus might be loyal
to a new government and which not?
To what extent should we punish those members of the security apparatus who
have committed crimes against the Iraqi people (eg torture)?
Are we obliged to work with the new Iraqi Government on SSR or can it be
imposed?
How do we reform the working culture of the security sector so that it operates
on the basis of humanitarian values in support of legitimate government?
How can we resettle or rehabilitate those pre‑Saddam individuals removed
from the security sector so that they do not work clandestinely for the
re‑establishment of a S[addam] H[ussein]‑type regime?”
9  FCO Paper, [undated version received at AHGI, 11 October 2002], ‘Models for Administering a
Post‑Saddam Iraq’.
10  Minute Dodd to Manning, 14 October 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’ attaching Paper, 14 October 2002,
‘Whitehall Iraq Contingency Planning’.
11 Letter Gray to Drummond, 18 October 2002, ‘Papers for the AHGI’ attaching Paper, 17 October 2002,
‘Iraq: Security Sector Reform’.
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