4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
650.
Dr Roper wrote
that he was “more concerned” by a letter sent by the
chemical
warfare
expert in Dr Jones’ team on 20 September, which they had discussed
with
the CW
expert the following week. The CW expert had:
“…
explained his understanding of the CW position in Iraq noting that
there had
been
thousands of tonnes of chemical agent, much of it destroyed by
UNSCOM,
but he
noted that he couldn’t rule out the existence of a few hundred
tonnes of
unaccounted
stock some of which could retain potency. However his key point
was
that he had
seen no evidence that Iraq had resumed any production of
chemical
agent since
the Gulf War.”
651.
Dr Roper wrote
that he “was alerted to the existence of new sensitive
material
on CW
production” by an SIS officer by telephone. The conversation was
short but
Dr Roper
recalled that he was told “it referred to evidence of resumption in
CW
production”.
Dr Roper also wrote that he had been “assured” that Air Marshal
French
and
Mr Cragg had seen the document. Dr Roper could not recall the
precise date of
that conversation,
but he thought it had “probably” taken place before 23
September.
652.
Dr Roper wrote
that he had not discussed the existence of the new
intelligence
with either
AM French or Mr Cragg, or with anyone else. His conversation
with the CW
expert on
23 September:
“… was very
late in the dossier production process and only minor
editorial
comments on
the wording were being called for at this stage. I concluded
the
conversation
with [name of expert] suggesting that those responsible for forming
the
final
judgement no doubt had access to this new intelligence and would
take it into
consideration.
I took no further action.”
653.
The Inquiry
shares the view of the Butler Review that the dossier
contained
a stronger
assessment in relation to Iraqi chemical weapons production than
was
justified
by the available intelligence.
654.
The SIS
report of 11 September was a factor in that.
655.
Sir Richard
Dearlove’s concerns about ensuring the protection of
such an
important potential source of evidence were, in the
circumstances,
understandable.
656.
But the
Inquiry shares the conclusion of the Butler Review that it
should
have been
shown to the experts in the Defence Intelligence Staff who could
have
commented
on the credibility and validity of that report and the
subsequent
report
issued on 23 September and advised their senior managers and
the
Assessments Staff.
657.
Sir Richard
Dearlove’s personal intervention, and its urgency, gave
added
weight to a
report that had not been properly evaluated and would have
coloured
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