6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
•
The
implications of establishing administrative sectors in Iraq: “If
the UK takes
on one, the
cost – in terms of money and administrative burden – could
rocket,
and our
stay lengthen.”
“… we
should learn and apply some generic post-conflict lessons
including: ensuring
UN
involvement does not stretch to running economic policy or
co-ordinating
reconstruction;
not committing resources until a needs assessment has been
done;
and trying
to prevent foreign ministries taking financing decisions (even by
default).
“The
momentum of this issue makes it difficult for us to influence
decisions, as does
the
concentration of decision-making in the US White House/NSC and
Department
of Defense.
But the UK is feeding into this at official level via a new Iraq
Planning
Unit – we
are leading an economic sub-group within this.”
509.
Mr John
Dodds, Head of the Treasury Defence, Diplomacy and Intelligence
Team,
sent
comments to Mr Brown the same day, focusing on
sectorisation:
“… a key
decision that will need to be taken very soon is whether … the
country
should be
split into sectors for administrative and peacekeeping purposes
and
whether the
UK should take responsibility for one of the sectors.
“This is a
decision that will have substantial public expenditure
implications. If
there were
a UK sector we would find ourselves locked into the management
of
the
aftermath for a substantial period (perhaps as long as five years)
rather than
allowing
other countries – who will not have borne any costs of the conflict
itself –
to make
their contribution.”216
510.
Mr Dodds
added that the net additional cost to the UK “would certainly
be
hundreds of
millions of pounds a year”, more if there were no UN authorisation.
The
US appeared
to favour a sectoral approach, but the need to bring in expertise
from the
widest
possible range of sources and to avoid the perception that the UK
was occupying
“part of
the Arab world” argued for a more internationalist approach.
Mr Dodds explained
that
Treasury officials were taking every opportunity to stress to FCO
and MOD
colleagues
that Mr Brown would want to have an input to any decision on
sectorisation,
but
recommended that he underline the point himself with Mr Blair,
Mr Straw and
Mr Hoon.
511.
The following
day, a Treasury official provided further advice to Mr Brown
and
Mr Paul
Boateng, Chief Secretary to the Treasury.217
He reported
that the Treasury now
had the
MOD’s first estimates of the likely total cost of conflict in Iraq
“if a decision is
216
Minute
Dodds to Chancellor, 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq – “Aftermath” – UK
Role’ attaching Paper Dodds/
[Treasury
junior official], 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq conflict – public
expenditure impact’.
217
Minute
[Treasury
junior official] to Chancellor, 20 February 2002, ‘Iraq: update on
potential cost and how
should we
present them?’
399