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6.5  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to March 2003
The implications of establishing administrative sectors in Iraq: “If the UK takes
on one, the cost – in terms of money and administrative burden – could rocket,
and our stay lengthen.”
508.  The paper stated:
“… we should learn and apply some generic post-conflict lessons including: ensuring
UN involvement does not stretch to running economic policy or co-ordinating
reconstruction; not committing resources until a needs assessment has been done;
and trying to prevent foreign ministries taking financing decisions (even by default).
“The momentum of this issue makes it difficult for us to influence decisions, as does
the concentration of decision-making in the US White House/NSC and Department
of Defense. But the UK is feeding into this at official level via a new Iraq Planning
Unit – we are leading an economic sub-group within this.”
509.  Mr John Dodds, Head of the Treasury Defence, Diplomacy and Intelligence Team,
sent comments to Mr Brown the same day, focusing on sectorisation:
“… a key decision that will need to be taken very soon is whether … the country
should be split into sectors for administrative and peacekeeping purposes and
whether the UK should take responsibility for one of the sectors.
“This is a decision that will have substantial public expenditure implications. If
there were a UK sector we would find ourselves locked into the management of
the aftermath for a substantial period (perhaps as long as five years) rather than
allowing other countries – who will not have borne any costs of the conflict itself –
to make their contribution.”216
510.  Mr Dodds added that the net additional cost to the UK “would certainly be
hundreds of millions of pounds a year”, more if there were no UN authorisation. The
US appeared to favour a sectoral approach, but the need to bring in expertise from the
widest possible range of sources and to avoid the perception that the UK was occupying
“part of the Arab world” argued for a more internationalist approach. Mr Dodds explained
that Treasury officials were taking every opportunity to stress to FCO and MOD
colleagues that Mr Brown would want to have an input to any decision on sectorisation,
but recommended that he underline the point himself with Mr Blair, Mr Straw and
Mr Hoon.
511.  The following day, a Treasury official provided further advice to Mr Brown and
Mr Paul Boateng, Chief Secretary to the Treasury.217 He reported that the Treasury now
had the MOD’s first estimates of the likely total cost of conflict in Iraq “if a decision is
216 Minute Dodds to Chancellor, 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq – “Aftermath” – UK Role’ attaching Paper Dodds/
[Treasury junior official], 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq conflict – public expenditure impact’.
217 Minute [Treasury junior official] to Chancellor, 20 February 2002, ‘Iraq: update on potential cost and how
should we present them?’
399
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