The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
91.
The DFID note
advised that:
•
Iraq’s
infrastructure had now been “stabilised” and some improvements
had
been made.
But Iraqi citizens did not see that; it was vital for security that
visible
progress
was made fast, and that the IIG told Iraqi citizens what was
being
achieved.
•
There were
“very few” PCO staff in the South. Could the US speed up
the
deployment
of PCO staff, and give USAID a bigger role?
•
Iraqi
systems were not yet working. The US and UK needed to press
Prime
Minister
Allawi to get Iraqi oil revenues into the provinces, and press the
UN and
World Bank
to deploy experts.
92.
Mr Quarrey’s
briefing for Mr Blair suggested that he could refer to Prime
Minister
Allawi’s
concern about the pace of delivery on
reconstruction.46
93.
In a telephone
conversation with President Bush on 24 September, Mr Blair set
out
three
priority issues, as discussed with Prime Minister
Allawi:
•
the need to
strengthen Prime Minister Allawi’s office;
•
accelerating
work to show the ISF had capacity to act; and
•
increasing
the pace of development activity.47
94.
On 1 October,
in response to a request for advice from Mr Benn’s Private
Secretary
on the
World Bank and UN Trust Funds, a DFID official advised
that:
“…
implementation is proceeding, but not as quickly as we would wish
or had
anticipated
when we decided to contribute to them in February”.48
95.
There was as
yet insufficient evidence to decide whether DFID should
make
further contributions
to the Trust Funds. Equally, withdrawing UK funds from
the Trust
Funds would
be difficult to justify and would undermine UK efforts to
persuade other
donors
(especially those not present on the ground in Iraq) to contribute
to the
reconstruction
effort.
96.
Iraqi Deputy
Prime Minister Dr Barham Salih presented the IIG’s
National
Development
Strategy (NDS) at the third meeting of the International
Reconstruction
Fund
Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) Donor Committee in Tokyo on 14
October.49
46
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 23 September 2004, ‘Phonecall with
President Bush,
24
September’.
47
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 24 September 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Phone
Conversation with
President Bush,
24 September’.
48
Minute DFID
[junior official] to DFID [junior official], 1 October 2004, ‘Iraq
Trust Funds: Secretary
of State’s
Conversation with Ann Clwyd MP’.
49
Telegram
181 Tokyo to FCO London, 15 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Tokyo Donor
Committee Meetings,
13‑14 October’.
212