The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
99.
In November
2007, the MOD produced a force protection policy which has
remained
under
“constant review”.44
It is
unclear from the evidence how many force protection
policies
preceded this version but the MOD has been unable to find any
individual force
protection
policies before November 2007.
100.
The MOD told
the Inquiry that the version dated 21 May 2015 “defines
risk
ownership
and governance more clearly than its predecessors”.45
The MOD
said
that this
had been integrated into wider MOD risk management processes which
had
also been
revised.
101.
The MOD said
that the Operational Commander (which for Iraq was the CJO),
was
accountable
to CDS for understanding, quantifying and reducing risk to the
force and
mission
respectively. That risk response may require changes to activities
or capabilities.
102.
On 31 August
2010, an analysis of the land operation in Iraq was
published
on behalf
of the Chief of the General Staff by Brigadier Ben
Barry.46
It was
known as
“the Barry
Report”.
103.
On specifying
equipment requirements, the report stated:
“It appears
for much of this period the mechanism for formulating new
capability
requirements
was sub‑optimal. Where there was a strong coherent sponsor in
the
Army or MOD
there was more chance of requirements being quickly identified
and
UORs
succeeding. Difficulties experienced at the start of this period
[2005] were
overcome to
a certain extent by fielding Equipment Capability staff to PJHQ
and
Basra. But
it was not clear who owned the medium term vision for the
capability
requirements
of the theatre and longer term thinking on equipment
requirements
was
inhibited by the lack of campaign continuity.”
104.
The report
said that, where UORs succeeded, “some of these were the result
of
‘pull’ from
theatre, others the result of ‘push’ from equipment staff in the
MOD. This was
the case
with Mastiff, the requirement for which was formulated in
London.”
105.
The report
quoted evidence from Lt Gen Applegate:
“We must
recognise that UORs were/are generally reactive and until about
2009
when I
managed to convince people to think in campaign terms, there was
a
tendency to
think only six months ahead: some of the solutions could not
be
delivered
in that timescale and were refused … our six‑monthitis and lack
of
a campaign
design limited sufficient forward thinking.”
44
Letter
Duke‑Evans to Aldred, 26 June 2015, ‘Procuring Military
Equipment’.
45
Letter
Duke‑Evans to Aldred, 26 June 2015, ‘Procuring Military
Equipment’.
46
Report Land
Command, 31 August 2010, ‘Operations in Iraq: An Analysis From a
Land Perspective’.
20