3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
326.
Mr McKane told
the Inquiry that the Cabinet Office ‘Options Paper’:
“… was
prepared in the same kind of way as the previous one; that is a
framework
for the
paper was produced and different elements were commissioned
from
different
Whitehall departments … It went through a number of drafts and
was
finalised
in early March.”119
327.
Lord Wilson
told the Inquiry that the initiative for the Cabinet Office
paper
had arisen
from a discussion he had had with Mr McKane; and that it was
“just
328.
Lord Wilson
could not remember the precise origins of the paper:
“All I can
tell you now is that the idea of this paper was raised … and … I
thought
it was
timely … We had not been looking at Iraq for a while. We used to do
regular
reviews of
policy on Iraq and I thought it was about time we did another … I
am not
sure if
No.10 knew or not …” 121
329.
Later in the
hearing, Lord Wilson added:
“Ever the
optimist, I had rather hoped we would show the options paper to
the
Prime
Minister or to No.10 … and get a meeting of DOP on it. Forlorn
hope. I asked
after a
while … and I had been told that it had been wrapped up in the
briefing for
330.
The Inquiry
sought additional evidence from the two members of Mr
McKane’s
staff who
had written the Cabinet Office paper. They were asked about the
process for
producing
the paper, the basis for the judgements made, and what changes were
made
as a result
of Sir David Manning’s meeting and who was responsible for the
advice that
led to
those changes.
331.
In a statement
for the Inquiry, Mr Drummond wrote: “From 9/11 until
February
2002,
Afghanistan and other post 9/11 counter terrorism issues took a
higher priority
than Iraq
in the Secretariat’s work.”123
Mr McKane
had handed over responsibility for
co‑ordination
of policy on Iraq to him around the end of 2001.
332.
Describing the
production of the paper, Mr Drummond wrote that, by
mid-February,
Mr Blair
had been expected to have “a preliminary discussion” on Iraq during
his meeting
with
President Bush in early April. Mr Drummond’s recollection was that
“the Secretariat
had offered
to produce an options paper as background”. The paper had to be
prepared
quickly in
time for Mr Blair’s return from the Commonwealth Heads of
Government
Meeting
which ended on 5 March.
119
Public
hearing, 19 January 2011, page 35.
120
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, page 15.
121
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, page 41.
122
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, pages 83-84.
123
Statement,
28 March 2013, pages 1-2.
445