The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

“I have now done so. Before feeding it in to the Whitehall [Pigott] group, it would be

helpful to know whether the Foreign Secretary thinks we are on the right lines. At

this stage, it is only to inform MOD contingency planning: at the right point, these

issues would have to be negotiated carefully and at a high level with the Americans,

who will have their own priorities. My proposal is as follows:

• ‘A stable and law-abiding Iraq, within its present borders, co-operating with

the international community, no longer posing a threat to global security or

to its neighbours, and abiding by its international obligations on control of its

WMD.’”

204. Mr Ricketts reported that the Pigott Group had debated a number of issues related

to the end state, including:

“... should there be anything more explicit about a future regime abiding by

international norms on the treatment of its own population? I have got ‘law-abiding’

which is designed to capture that. There is a risk in overloading a definition of the

‘end state’ with desirable outcomes which cannot be achieved by military means.”

205. Mr Ricketts explained that the meeting had commissioned further work on a range

of intelligence issues, which would be addressed by the JIC. The military would work on

“the likely scale of effort required”. He proposed that he or Mr Stephen Wright, Director

General Defence and Intelligence, should represent the FCO at future meetings,

accompanied by Mr Edward Chaplin (Mr Goulty’s successor as Director Middle East

and North Africa), who should remain the FCO “point man on Iraq issues”.

206. Mr Ricketts made no reference to further contingency planning in the FCO.

207. On 3 May, Mr Ricketts sent a very slightly amended definition of the end state,

agreed by Mr Straw, to Mr Webb:

“A stable and law-abiding Iraq, within its present borders, co-operating with the

international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or

to international security, and abiding by its international obligations on control

of its WMD.”119

208. On 10 May, Lt Gen Pigott advised Mr Hoon that, although his Group was focused

on military options, it needed to be supported by thinking on the end state.120 He

explained that the FCO was already engaged on the issue.

209. A revised version of the end state, agreed by Mr Straw and Mr Hoon, was sent

to Mr Blair on 31 May and is described later in this Section.

119 Letter Ricketts to Webb, 3 May 2002, ‘Iraq: Contingency planning’.

120 Minute DCDS(C) to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 10 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.

148