Previous page | Contents | Next page
10.2  |  Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
324.  A DFID official briefed the ISOG on the impact of the US reconstruction effort.
He advised that “the US was well aware of its failings … and there was little we could
tell them that they didn’t already realise and were actively trying to change”. The most
significant impact DFID could have on the US was by working jointly with them in
the South.
325.  The Cabinet Office paper on funding for Iraq was finalised for the 21 July meeting
of DOP, chaired by Mr Blair, which considered whether or not the UK Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan should move from the north to Helmand
and what, if any, additional force package should be deployed to support it (see
Section 9.4).189
326.  The Cabinet Office paper, which was presented as an appendix to the main MOD
paper, set out the estimates of financial pressures associated with the Iraq campaign for
2005/06, 2006/07 and 2007/08.
327.  On 17 June, a junior DFID official invited Mr Benn to endorse the “annual review”
of DFID’s Interim Country Assistance Plan (I-CAP).190
328.  In his covering minute, the official advised that the I-CAP (which had been
published in February 2004) had been expected to remain in place for two years, and
contained a commitment to undertake a “substantial review” after one year.
329.  However, events had “pre-empted a pro-active review”. Those events were:
the exchange between Mr Blair and Mr Benn in October 2004 on the need to
accelerate the pace of reconstruction and increase the impact of DFID’s bilateral
programme in the short term;
Mr Chakrabarti’s and Mr Drummond’s visit to Iraq in December 2004 to review
DFID programmes and assess priorities for 2005;
Mr Benn’s agreement in December 2004 to priorities for 2005;
the agreement in February 2005 of the 2005 UK Iraq Strategy. That Strategy
included “most of the items that we suggested”, and was in line with priorities
agreed by Mr Benn; and
subsequently, “unexpected and significant funding constraints” arising from a
smaller than expected budget for 2005/06 and an increase in life support costs
levelled by the FCO.
189  Paper MOD Officials, 19 July 2005, ‘Afghanistan: Resources and Strategic Planning’.
190  Minute DFID [junior official] to Private Secretary [DFID], 17 June 2005, ‘Iraq: Interim Country
Assistance Plan: Annual Review’ attaching Paper DFID, [undated], ‘DFID: Iraq Country Assistance
Plan Review 2004/5’.
251
Previous page | Contents | Next page