The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
backing is
uncertain. The willingness and ability of the ISF to take on the
JAM is also
in
doubt.”
108.
The JIC
assessed that the strength of JAM was uncertain. MNF estimates
placed
it at
10,000 active supporters plus 20,000 sympathisers who could be
mobilised rapidly.
Capabilities
varied.
109.
On 27 July,
the Iraq Policy Unit (IPU) responded to Mr Patey’s valedictory
telegram:
“We agree
that, in the face of the challenges you describe, our best course
is to hold
our nerve
and stick broadly to our current strategy. We should resist the
argument
that the
right response to the current difficulties is to plan to prolong
our military
presence.
To do so would only entrench the dependency culture we are working
to
wean Iraq
off, and rob us of an acceptable exit strategy.”72
110.
On 27 July,
the Iraq Strategy Group (ISG) reflected on reporting from
Baghdad,
and its
implications for the existing strategy.73
The Group
agreed that, although success
or failure
in Baghdad would be critical to overall campaign success in Iraq
and was
therefore
the coalition’s highest priority, the “best way for the UK to
contribute to the
wider
military campaign was to continue to focus our limited resources on
MND(SE),
in particular,
on Basra”.
“The extent
to which … the Iraqi Government would allow us to be robust
was
a concern.”
112.
The ISG agreed
that the UK should:
“… press
the Iraqis and US to maintain momentum of security transition …
More
broadly, we
should firmly resist any US suggestion … that the current
problems
meant that
we should put more resources into Iraq, and plan to stay longer.
Sending
this
message risked perpetuating the current Iraqi dependency culture,
and robbing
us of any
perspective74
of military
withdrawal in an acceptable timeframe. We
recognised,
however, that the success of this strategy would depend entirely on
the
readiness
of the Iraqi security forces to take over the job. We would need to
make
a critical
judgement on this in the autumn.”
113.
Mr Martin
Dinham, DFID Director, Europe, Middle East and the Americas,
proposed
that the UK
should focus its future support to Iraq on central government – in
particular
on
budgetary management and critical economic reform – as the security
situation
72
eGram
32790/06 FCO London to Baghdad, 27 July 2006, ‘Iraq: Reply to your
Valedictory’.
73
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 27 July 2006, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group, 27 July’.
74
The Inquiry
believes that this is a drafting error and should read
‘prospect’.
22