The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
893.
Coalition
Forces remained in place in Fallujah although Mr Richmond
reported that
“military
action is not imminent”. It was hoped that:
“… if the
citizens [of Fallujah] gained confidence, they would be able to put
pressure
on the
extreme elements”.
894.
Maj Gen
Stewart told the Inquiry that the impact of events in Fallujah had
been
significant
among the Shia community in Southern Iraq.493
At Friday
prayers the
dominant
issue had been the need to raise money for fellow Iraqis in
Fallujah, because
what was
happening there was “way beyond the pale”.
895.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald told the Inquiry that:
“It wasn’t
just that we were worried about the proportionality of the tactics
that were
used or
about the perception in the international and Iraqi media of what
went on. It
was also
that it happened at the same time as American action on the Shia
side to
which the
Shia reacted very violently … Ultimately the strategic threat was a
loss of
896.
Sir David
Richmond told the Inquiry that the change in US stance as
April
progressed
was not exclusively because of the UK. Action in Washington,
threatened
resignations
from the GC, and the position of Mr Brahimi all had an
influence.495
897.
By mid-April,
the Coalition had regained control of nearly all the towns that
had
been taken
by JAM, leaving Muqtada al-Sadr’s forces restricted to the cities
of Najaf,
Kufa and
parts of Karbala, which were then the focus of millions of Shia
Pilgrims
observing
the Muslim holiday of Arba’een.496
898.
After reading
briefing given to him in advance of meeting President Bush,
Mr Blair
expressed
concern to Sir Nigel Sheinwald about the security situation in Iraq
and the
problems
facing the CPA in implementing its main programmes and
policies.497
899.
Sir Nigel
commissioned 15:
“…
unvarnished accounts of where things stand, with as much local
colour as
possible;
and with clear recommendations, where appropriate, for how to
improve
things …
The Prime Minister is conscious that implementation of these
programmes
depends on
the Americans, in Iraq and in Washington. It is therefore essential
that
departments
in London should ensure that their opposite numbers in
Washington
are aware
of our concerns, and that we work with them to produce credible
plans for
improving
performance.”
493
Public
hearing, 9 December 2009, page 71.
494
Public
hearing, 16 December 2009, pages 51-52.
495
Public
hearing, 26 January 2011, page 22.
496 Allawi
AA. The
Occupation of Iraq: winning the war, losing the
peace. Yale
University Press, 2007;
Sanchez RS
& Phillips DT. Wiser in
Battle: A Soldier’s Story. HarperCollins,
2008.
497
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 19 April 2004, ‘Iraq’.
352