The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

we ought to know that the US has a militarily plausible plan with a reasonable prospect

of success compared to the risks and within the framework of international law”.1

6. Mr Hoon had also suggested UK involvement in US planning would “improve” the

US process and enable Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)

to either “reassure you that there is a sound military plan or give you a basis to hold

back if the US cannot find a sensible scheme”.

7. Much of the discussion at Crawford took place privately between the two leaders.2

Sir David Manning, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser and Head of the Overseas and

Defence Secretariat (OD Sec), recorded that the meeting on Saturday morning was

informed of a number of points, including:

• There was no war plan for Iraq.

• Thinking so far had been on a broad, conceptual level.

• A very small cell in Central Command (CENTCOM) in Florida had recently been

set up to do some planning and to think through the various options.

• When the US had done that, US and UK planners would be able to sit down

together to examine the options.

• The US and UK would work through the issues together.

8. Sir David Manning also recorded that Mr Blair had concluded President Bush

probably wanted to build a coalition.

9. Mr Hoon discussed Iraq with Adm Boyce and Sir Kevin Tebbit, MOD Permanent

Under Secretary (PUS), on 8 April (see Section 6.1). He commissioned work on military

options as a “precaution against the possibility that military action might have to be taken

at some point in the future”.3

10. On 12 April, Mr Simon Webb, MOD Policy Director, sent Mr Hoon a “think piece”

to give context to the work on Iraq.4

11. Mr Webb explored potential end states for military action in Iraq in the context of

Mr Blair’s “commitment to regime change (‘if necessary and justified’)” in his speech

at College Station on 7 April. Mr Webb added that:

• “Commitment on timing has been avoided and an expectation has developed

that no significant operation will be mounted while major violence continues in

Israel/Palestine.”

• “Both Crawford and contacts with the Pentagon confirm that US thinking has not

identified either a successor or a constitutional restructuring to provide a more

1 Minute Hoon to Prime Minister, 22 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.

2 Letter Manning to McDonald, 8 April 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to the United States: 5-7 April’.

3 Minute Watkins to PSO/CDS and PS/PUS, 8 April 2002, ‘Iraq’.

4 Minute Webb to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 12 April 2002, ‘Bush and the War on Terrorism’.

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