The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
294.
At a press
conference after the meeting of the Security Council on 5
February
(addressed
in Section 3.7), Mr Annan stated that, after any conflict,
“the UN always had
a role to
play”.147
He added
that the post-conflict role of the UN in Iraq:
“… has not
been discussed. As you know, we are doing some
contingency
planning on
the humanitarian side. This is also something that we have given
some
preliminary
thought to, but we are not there at all.”
295.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 6 February that planning for the aftermath
and
humanitarian
relief needed “greater emphasis”.
296.
The same
day, he commissioned a paper on “aftermath and
humanitarian
issues”, to
be co-ordinated by the FCO.
297.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 6 February that “planning for the aftermath of
military
action and
humanitarian relief needed greater emphasis”.148
298.
Mr Straw
said that the aftermath was “being discussed intensively” with Ms
Short
and
Mr Hoon.
299.
Points made in
discussion included:
•
The word
“aftermath” was “ill-chosen: it incorrectly implied that Iraq would
be
utterly
destroyed by military conflict whereas we should gear our thinking
around
the future
of the people of Iraq and their interests”.
•
The
reconstruction and development of Iraq would “provide opportunities
for
British
companies to be involved”.
•
The focus
after hostilities “had to be on civil society which had suffered 35
years
of tyranny
that had reduced the country to the point where 60 percent of
the
population
relied on United Nations food programmes”.
•
It was
“essential” that the UN should be involved in Iraq’s redevelopment
after
any
military action “to avoid the military occupation being viewed as
an army of
occupation”.
300.
On 6 February,
Mr Blair held a meeting with Mr Straw, Mr Hoon and
senior officials
from the
MOD, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), No.10 and the Cabinet
Office
to discuss
how to minimise civilian casualties during an air campaign. The
meeting is
described
in more detail in Section 6.2.
301.
At the
meeting, Mr Blair commissioned a paper on “aftermath and
humanitarian
issues” for
14 February.149
No.10
instructed the FCO to co-ordinate with the MOD, DFID
and the
Cabinet Office.
147
UN News
Centre, 5 February 2003, Secretary-General’s
press encounter following Security Council
meeting and
Luncheon on Iraq (unofficial transcript).
148
Cabinet
Conclusions, 6 February 2003.
149
Letter
Rycroft to Watkins, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Meeting, 6 February’.
362