The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
114.
On 20 March,
the deployment of UK 3 Commando Brigade was brought
forward
from the
evening of 21 March to 1900 on 20 March.67
115.
Royal Marines
of 40 and 42 Commando launched assaults on the al-Faw
Peninsula
during the night of 20/21 March.68
116.
Marines from
40 Commando were reported to be ashore on the al-Faw
Peninsula
on the
morning of 21 March.69
117.
The
landings by the Royal Marines did not go entirely as
planned.
118.
The risk
that the beaches would be mined was not explicitly identified
and
addressed,
and does not seem to have been drawn to the attention of
Mr Hoon.
119.
As Chief of
the Defence Staff, that was Adm Boyce’s
responsibility.
120.
The crash of a
US helicopter carrying US and UK personnel in Kuwait
resulted
in a
temporary suspension of US Sea Knight flights, as weather
conditions worsened,
delaying
the deployment from 42 Commando by around six
hours.70
The crash
killed four
US aircrew
and eight UK personnel.71
121.
The
MOD’s Lessons for
the Future report stated
that, despite efforts “against the
clock” to
clear a beach for landing the light armour, the risk was deemed to
be too high
when the
scale of mining became apparent. The vehicles had to be landed back
in
Kuwait and
eventually reached their positions “some 24 hours
later”.72
122.
Lieutenant
General Sir James Dutton, who commanded 3 Commando
Brigade
from July
2002, told the Inquiry that the landings had not entirely gone to
plan.73
A decision
had been made to abort the planned US hovercraft landing of the
brigade’s
light,
tracked armoured vehicles because the risk was considered to be too
great.
The helicopter
crash had delayed the arrival of 42 Commando by “about 10 to 12
hours”.
123.
The overnight
report for 20/21 March prepared by staff in COBR for
No.10
recorded:
“Overall, Coalition Forces have met slightly more resistance than
anticipated,
and there
is no evidence yet of widespread Iraqi
capitulation.” 74
124.
Gen Reith told
the Inquiry that intelligence had “lost sight of the Special
Republican
Guard”
about two weeks before the invasion and that it later “transpired
that they had
been broken
down into small elements and placed within various
brigades”.75
67
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 20 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Action’.
68
House of
Commons Library, Research Paper 03/50, 23 May 2003, ‘The Conflict
in Iraq’.
69
Minutes, 21
March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
70
Ministry of
Defence, Operations
in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December
2003.
71
Major Jason
Ward, Captain Philip Guy, Warrant Officer Mark Stratford, Colour
Sergeant John Cecil,
Sergeant
Les Hehir, Lance Bombardier Llywelyn Evans, Operator Mechanic
(Communications)
Ian
Seymour, Marine Sholto Hedenskog.
72
Ministry of
Defence, Operations
in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, December
2003.
73
Public
hearing, 12 July 2010, pages 14-15.
74
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Manning, 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Overnight Sitrep’.
75
Private
hearing, 15 January 2010, page 55.
22