The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
initiatives
in Basra, and said that Mr Brown wanted to see “tangible
progress in 2008 –
for example
at the port or airport”.
888.
Section 9.6
describes the development of the UK’s Short-Term Strategy for
Iraq
between
November 2007 and April 2008.
889.
Ms Sue
Wardell, DFID Director Middle East, said that a choice needed to
be
made
between maintaining current levels of effort during 2008 or
“surging resources
temporarily”.
The surge might focus on the agricultural sector, its links with
the oil sector,
and
regional trade.
890.
Mr McDonald
asked DFID to present options and recommendations to
Ministers.
891.
Lt Gen Rollo
reported on 3 February that there had been “positive
discussions”
with DFID
in Basra on the deployment of additional experts to Basra and
Baghdad to
support
Mr Brown’s economic initiatives.522
He
added:
“Given that
the initiative was originally announced in early October 2007 it
would
be good to
see decisions in London to turn these into effect. General
Petraeus’
enquiries
into what hard measures are in place to support the PM’s words
have
become
pointed and public.”
892.
Maj Gen Binns
left MND(SE) on 12 February and was succeeded by
Major General
Barney White-Spunner.523
893.
Reflecting on
progress over the previous six months, Maj Gen Binns
commented:
“It has
taken me six months to develop an understanding of the Economic
and
Political
Lines of Operation. I have learned to measure economic
redevelopment in
decades, to
be patient, to listen to, and take the advice of, specialists in
the PRT,
some of
whom have been in Iraq for more than 3 years. We should stop
beating up
on DFID;
those, like me initially, who talk of ‘windows of opportunity’ and
‘economic
surges’ are
misguided. Iraq is awash with money. The Iraqis need help in
spending it
and
overcoming corruption through good governance, which is exactly the
approach
taken by
our PRT. Of course we will continue to use CERPs money to buy
consent
for
military operations, but let us not
pretend
that this is sustainable development,
because on
some occasions it is the reverse. In 10 years time Basrawis
will
remember
that the US Army Corps of Engineers built their Children’s
Cancer
Hospital;
they will probably have forgotten Operation SINBAD.”
894.
In his formal
end of tour report, Maj Gen Binns commented that
co-operation
between
departments in theatre was “superb”.524
522
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 3 February 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report 3 Feb
08’.
523
Minute
Binns to CJO, 7 February 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 07
February 2008’.
524
Minute
Binns to CJO, 12 February 2008, ‘Op TELIC – GOC 1 (UK) Armd Div
Post Operation Report’.
340