6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

19. Mr Blair sent President Bush a paper, ‘The War Against Terrorism: The Second

Phase’, on 4 December.10

20. The paper comprised an overview of the possible approaches to potential terrorist

threats in seven countries11 and a ‘Strategy for Confronting Islamic Extremism’ in

moderate Muslim states.

21. In relation to Iraq, the key points were:

• Iraq was a threat because: “it has WMD capability; is acquiring more; has shown

its willingness to use it; and can export that capability”. Iraq was in breach of

UN Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1284 (1999) and

Saddam Hussein supported certain Palestinian terrorist groups and used terror

tactics against Iraqi dissidents.

• Any link to 11 September and Al Qaida (AQ) was “at best very tenuous”.

• Although “people want to be rid of Saddam”, international opinion outside

the US and the UK would “at present” be “reluctant” to support immediate

military action.

22. Mr Blair suggested that a “strategy for regime change that builds over time” was

needed “until we get to the point where military action could be taken if necessary”

without losing international support and “facing a choice between massive intervention

and nothing”.

23. Although the UK was aware in December 2001 that the US was conducting

a full review of all its options, there are no indications in the papers seen by the

Inquiry that the UK was aware that President Bush had commissioned General

Tommy Franks, Commander in Chief US Central Command (CENTCOM), to look

at military options for removing Saddam Hussein; and that that would include

options for a conventional land invasion.

24. Mr Kevin Tebbit, the MOD Permanent Under Secretary (PUS), visited Washington

from 6 to 7 December where his meetings with a range of contacts included discussions

on Afghanistan and the next stage of the “war against terrorism”.12

25. While he was in Washington, an attempt was made by a senior Republican close

to the Pentagon to persuade Mr Tebbit that the Iraqi National Congress (INC) could be

a force to be reckoned with which would be sufficient to cause an Iraqi response and

enable the US to take supportive military action.13

10 Paper Blair [to President Bush], 4 December 2001, ‘The War Against Terrorism: The Second Phase’.

11 Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Philippines, Somalia, Syria and Yemen.

12 Telegram 1684 Washington to FCO London, 8 December 2001, ‘Tebbit’s Visit to Washington:

Wider War Against Terrorism’.

13 Minute Wilson to PS/CDI, 13 December 2001, ‘Iraq: Is there a “Northern Alliance”?’.

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