The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“a
deterioration in the security situation resulting from a change in
the Shia
quiescence”;
•
a failure
to deliver an effective ISF (including police) and wider criminal
justice
capacity;
and
•
a prolonged
delay in the political process, caused (for example) by the
rejection
of the
draft Constitution in the October referendum.40
83.
Dr Reid
recognised that drawdown could have an impact on the broader UK
and
international
effort in the South:
“It is also
possible that other (FCO and DFID) activity in Iraq aimed at
developing
the Iraqi
Police Service and reconstruction will need to be curtailed or
reduced, with
consequent
implications for HMG’s wider effort, because of the difficulties of
running
projects
without UK military support and protection. This will need to be
looked at in
more detail
with Other Government Departments.
…
“The
announcement of any drawdown of UK forces in the South will have to
be
managed
carefully to ensure that there is no loss of confidence by major
NGOs (in
particular
the UN Agencies and the World Bank), which might lead them to
postpone
plans for
greater engagement in Iraq.”
84.
Dr Reid also
recognised that although the drawdown was likely to deliver
a
significant
cost saving to the military there would be a cost increase to other
parts of
the system:
“Other
Government Departments operating in Iraq may … face increased
security
costs as
they are forced to seek commercial alternatives to military force
protection.”
85.
Mr Blair
and President Bush spoke by video conference on 19
July.41
86.
A brief for
the discussion prepared by Mr Phillipson suggested that it
should include
an emerging
UK strategy for supporting mainstream Islam
internationally.42
Mr Phillipson
recorded
that:
“A key
objective of this strategy will be to rebut claims that current
terrorism is a
result of
our actions in Afghanistan and Iraq.”
87.
In their
conversation, Mr Blair commented to President Bush that there
was a
clear need
to take on terrorist ideology after the London attacks. Terrorists
should
not be
allowed to present themselves as the legitimate voice of
Afghanistan and Iraq:
“Defeating
terrorism in Iraq was crucial to defeating it
everywhere.”43
40
Paper
Secretary of State for Defence, 18 July 2005, ‘Operational
Transition in Iraq’.
41
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 19 July 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s videoconference
with President Bush’.
42
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 19 July 2005, ‘VTC with President
Bush, 1405-1450 19 July’.
43
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 19 July 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s videoconference
with President Bush’.
504