The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
CC
Kernaghan’s advice, DCC White’s views and Mr Daniel’s
resignation were
sufficient
to highlight that police reform – an essential part of the UK’s
exit strategy –
was in
serious difficulties.
60.
By the end of
November 2003, Mr Straw had clear evidence that police reform
in
Iraq lacked
strategic direction. He should have instigated consideration of the
UK’s
options for
resolving the problem, including work to define a UK position on
the right
strategy
for Iraqi policing.
61.
The response
of the AHMGIR, chaired by Mr Straw, was instead that the
UK
should
lobby the US to make improvements in police training. Mr Straw
should have
recognised
that lobbying alone would be insufficient to address the critical
lack of a
strategy/vision
for policing in Iraq. Mr Straw’s direction to Mr Sawers
(see Box, ‘Initial
problems
deploying UK police officers’, earlier in this Section) focused too
narrowly on
the
deployment of UK police officers rather than on the wider issues in
police reform.
62.
In
mid‑November, a new political timetable for Iraq was announced,
which brought
forward the
handover of power from the CPA to the Iraqi Transitional Government
(ITG)
to June
2004.35
Former DCC
Brand told the Inquiry that the change of timetable
critically
changed
everyone’s outlook: “all the focus was on ‘Let’s get this over to
the Iraqis’, and
so our
longer‑term intentions were almost squashed from there
on”.36
63.
Towards the
end of 2003, within the UK there was awareness that
assessments
given by US
commanders were “exaggerated”37
and there
were doubts about Iraqi
capacity. A
significant gap in figures was highlighted by the FCO, which
assessed
that there
were around 45,000 operational police officers throughout Iraq, all
requiring
some level
of re‑training. The US assessment was that there were 63,000
operational
police
officers.
64.
In the absence
of a coherent strategy, Coalition partners continued to
work
independently
of one another. An example of this occurred in February 2004,
when
the UK
started recruiting 40 retired UK officers to act as mentors. At the
same time,
the US was
developing plans to recruit around 500 police advisers from
Dyncorps to
act as
mentors, of which 50 were planned for deployment to the South. That
was met
with some
consternation by Mr Steve Casteel, who replaced Mr Kerik
as CPA Director
of Internal
Affairs in September 2003. He reportedly said: “This isn’t two
countries,
65.
Secretary
Rumsfeld transferred the responsibility for training and
mentoring
police
officers to the US military in March 2004 following a report by
Major General
35
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 18 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Timetable’.
36
Public
hearing, 29 June 2010, page 67.
37
Minute Dodd
to Sheinwald, 10 December 2003, ‘Iraq: Strategy
Group’.
38
Minute FCO
[junior official], to Buck, 4 February 2004, ‘Visit to Iraq 26‑30
Jan’.
426