The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
89.
The first
three were considered “defence/military elements” and potential
areas for
involvement
by the MOD. The MOD’s estimated total cost of those activities (for
the
whole of
Iraq) is set out in Table 1.
Activity
DDR
De‑mining
Reconstruction
and reorientation of the Iraqi Ministry of Defence
Total
Cost
(£m)
400
500
50
950
90.
The DAT
described a number of “high‑level risks”, including the potential
for “a lack
of
coherence between primary Coalition partners over SSR Policy”. The
paper stated:
“Whilst the
UK may try and influence the shape and content of such an
SSR
strategy,
the reality is that it will have to accommodate to the plans of the
senior
Coalition
partner/lead international body and their intentions for this area
of activity.”
91.
The Cabinet
Office circulated an agreed set of “Military Campaign Objectives”
on
18 March.68
The
“immediate military priorities” included to:
•
“contribute
to the creation of a secure environment so that normal life can
be
restored”;
and
•
“lay plans
for the reform of Iraq’s security forces”.
92.
The military
objectives were placed in the Library of the House of Commons
by
93.
On 19 March,
Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of the Defence Staff
(CDS),
issued his
Directive to Lieutenant General John Reith, Chief of Joint
Operations (CJO)
authorising
the commencement of Operation TELIC (UK military action in
Iraq).70
The tasks
of relevance to SSR were:
•
“Protect,
and be prepared to secure, essential Iraqi political,
administrative and
economic
infrastructure from unnecessary destruction in order to reassure
the
Iraqi
people and facilitate rapid regeneration.”
•
“Deter
opportunistic inter‑ethnic and inter‑communal
conflict.”
68
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 18 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign
Objectives’.
69
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 20 March
2003, column 1087.
70
Minute CDS
to CJO, 19 March 2003, ‘Chief of the Defence Staff Executive
Directive to the Joint
Commander
Operation TELIC Edition 2’.
84