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14.1  |  Military equipment (post-conflict)
RAF Regiment Land Rovers was not thought to be sufficient by the troops for the tasks
that they were expected to carry out in the vehicles”.
375.  On 16 July, Second Lieutenant Richard Shearer, Private Phillip Hewett and Private
Leon Spicer were killed in an EFP IED attack in al‑Amara.186 They were travelling in
a Snatch Land Rover.
376.  After 16 July until late August, the Chiefs of Staff reviewed progress on
countermeasures against the threat from IEDs using PIR devices and EFPs at every
meeting.187
377.  At the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 20 July, AM Torpy briefed that there had been a
13 per cent increase in the overall number of attacks in Iraq, with a 65 percent increase
in casualties as the lethality of attacks also rose.188
378.  The minutes stated:
“With the exception of Maysan, MND(SE) had remained comparatively quiet; the
fatal attack of a vehicle patrol on 16 Jul 05 had nevertheless resulted in a review
of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, including increased ISR [Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance] and use of SH [support helicopters], and the
possibility of deploying elements of the Divisional Reserve to ensure that essential
security and SSR could be sustained.”
379.  The update from Major General Mark Mans, Deputy Commanding General MNF‑I,
on 20 July said that the attack on 16 July was “the fifth EFP incident in the vicinity”
of al‑Amara since October 2004, including three devices which had been “found and
cleared”.189 The use of EFPs was “spreading”, including attacks in Mosul and Kirkuk.
Significant numbers had been used in attacks in Baghdad.
380.  On 22 July, a UOR was submitted for additional armour to protect Warrior vehicles
in Iraq.190
381.  The UOR said that, although the last three EFP attacks had been directed at
Snatch vehicles, there was no reason why insurgents would not try to ambush Warrior
vehicles, especially if Warrior was used “more in the future due to EFP attacks”. It was
“not possible” to protect Snatch, CVR(T), FV430 and Saxon against EFPs; the only
vehicle that could be “better protected” was Warrior. Warrior was currently being used
as the lead and rear vehicle for all convoys in Maysan province.
186  Report, 20 July 2005, ‘MNC‑I Update – 20 Jul 05’.
187  Minutes, 3 August 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting; Minutes, 17 August 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting;
Minutes, 24 August 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting; Minutes, 3 August 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting;
Minutes, 17 August 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting; Minutes, 24 August 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
188  Minutes, 20 July 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
189  Report, 20 July 2005, ‘MNC‑I Update – 20 Jul 05’.
190  Minute DEC(GM), 22 July 2005, ‘Operation TELIC 5 Urgent Operational Requirement I0XXX Business
Case: Warrior (WR) Additional Protection (WRAPUOR)’.
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