1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
Throughout
the 1990s, the UN Sanctions Committee and UN Member States
had
interpreted
the provisions of resolution 670 (1990) to require the Sanctions
Committee’s
approval
for all civilian flights to Iraq.
Baghdad
International Airport reopened in August 2000.17
An FCO
official informed the Private Office of Mr Robin Cook, the Foreign
Secretary,
on 22
September 2000 that a French civilian aircraft had flown from Paris
to Baghdad,
without the
Sanctions Committee’s approval.18
Although
the French Mission notified the
Committee
in advance, in doing so it stated that it was not seeking approval
for the flight
and it
disregarded a request from the chairman of the Committee that the
flight should be
delayed so
that the matter might be considered by Committee
members.
The FCO
official set out the background:
“The French
and Russians have been pressing for some time for a relaxation
on
civilian
flights to Baghdad, claiming it is time to end the cultural and
intellectual
isolation
of the Iraqi people. They challenge our interpretation of the
UNSCRs and
claim there
are no restrictions on flights which do not carry cargo, although
they
accept that
SCR 661 prohibits the financial arrangements necessary for
commercial
flights to
Iraq.”
The media
subsequently reported that Russia intended to resume scheduled
flights
to
Baghdad.
The
briefing for Mr Cook’s meeting with the French Foreign Minister, at
Cahors on
9 February
2001, stated that:
“Since
Baghdad International Airport reopened in August 2000, there have
been
over 150
humanitarian flights into Iraq. Although the Iraq regime has tried
to portray
these as
sanctions-breaking, all but a handful (including one French flight)
have
received
advance approval from the UN Sanctions Committee.”19
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Mr Straw stated that as a result of the
lack of action by
the UN to
censure the flight, Saddam Hussein demanded that other key
international
partners
begin flights into Baghdad, leading to the “total collapse” of the
travel ban.20
18.
With the
containment policy under pressure, and in preparation
for
discussions
with a new US Administration, the UK reviewed its policy on
Iraq.
19.
Mr Tom McKane,
Deputy Head of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat
(OD Sec) in
the Cabinet Office from September 1999 to September 2002,
described
in his
statement to the Inquiry how:
17
Minute FCO
[junior official] to PS [FCO], 8 February 2001, ‘Iraq: UK/French
Summit: Briefing for
Secretary
of State’.
18
Minute FCO
[junior official] to PS [FCO], 22 September 2000, ‘Iraq: French
Flight’.
19
Minute FCO
[junior official] to PS [FCO], 8 February 2001, ‘Iraq: UK/French
Summit: Briefing for
Secretary
of State’.
20
Statement,
4 May 2011, page 3.
193