The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“We had
discussions [with] the Treasury but it was quite obvious to us that
they
weren’t
going to give any more than they already had … They had put some
money
in upfront
[in March 2003, for humanitarian assistance], but, after that, they
said it is
time to
reprioritise.”343
571.
The CPA
allocated the balance of the funding for the Essential Services
Plan the
following
month.
572.
Mr Straw
wrote to Mr Boateng on 6 October, requesting £13.9m from the
Reserve
to improve
the content and professionalism of the Iraq Media Network, the
CPA’s main
channel of
communication with the Iraqi people.344
573.
Mr Straw
stated that the issue was a priority for Mr Blair. The FCO
could not fund
a new
priority that had emerged halfway through the financial year from
its existing,
very small
programme budgets: the FCO’s Public Diplomacy Challenge Fund had
an
allocation
of £2.5m in 2003/04, of which all but £50,000 had already been
allocated.
574.
A Treasury
official advised Mr Boateng that he should reject the
bid:
“The FCO
have not considered any other means to fund this strategy … They
have
not even
conserved a partial contribution from their own DEL … they have
not
engaged the
British Council, they have not looked to the Global Conflict
Prevention
Pool
(GCPP), and have not sought to reconcile their media work with
DFID’s.
“The Prime
Minister views an effective CPA media strategy as vital, therefore
the
FCO believe
we cannot resist a Reserve Claim and have abdicated
responsibility
for ensuring
that this package represents VFM [value for
money].”345
575.
The official
also advised Mr Boateng that the FCO was holding up agreement
to
a UK
pledge at the Madrid Donors Conference until the bid was
agreed.
576.
Mr Boateng
replied to Mr Straw on 16 October, rejecting the FCO’s bid on
the
grounds
that he was not convinced the proposal would deliver value for
money, and that
the FCO had
not fully explored the use of its existing
resources.346
577.
Mr Straw
responded on 20 October:
“You repeat
the mantra that we must look for existing resources within the
FCO,
the GCPP
and other departments … But it is not clear to me whether the
Treasury
has a view
as to how much the FCO can reprioritise without damaging the
delivery
of other
Government priorities overseas in a way which is self‑defeating. In
the
343
Public
hearing, 22 January 2010, page 39.
344
Letter
Straw to Boateng, 6 October 2003, ‘Reconstructing the Iraqi Media
Network: Claim on the
Reserve’.
345
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chief Secretary, 14 October 2003,
‘FCO Reserve Claim for Iraq Media
Strategy
Costs’.
346
Letter
Boateng to Straw, 16 October 2003, ‘Iraq Reserve Claim:
Reconstructing the Media Network’.
538