1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
{{major
components used for the indigenous production of
missiles;
{{chemical
weapons production equipment; and
{{acquisition,
production and destruction of materials and equipment,
agents
and
munitions for biological weapons.
•
Provision
of information and documents relating to:
{{production,
filling and deployment of special missile warheads;
{{Iraq’s
declarations on VX;
{{use and
status of equipment evacuated from chemical weapons
facilities
before the
adoption of resolution 687; and
{{destruction of
missile propellants.
514.
On
16 June, following a visit to Baghdad, Mr Butler reported
that, although Mr Aziz
did not
accept all the tasks listed in the UNSCOM paper were disarmament
issues,
they had
agreed a schedule of work to be carried out over two months to “try
to resolve
the
outstanding disarmament issues”.205
Mr Butler
described the talks as “cordial and
professional”,
reflecting “the new spirit of co-operation between both sides”
following
the
signature of the MOU on 23 February. If Iraq met its
undertakings to provide full
co-operation,
it “should be possible for the Commission to resolve remaining
issues and
begin to
formulate reports … pursuant to paragraph 22 of resolution 687
(1991)”.
515.
It is clear
from the detailed record of the discussions, however, that there
were still
significant
differences between UNSCOM and Iraq.
516.
During the
talks, Mr Aziz challenged UNSCOM’s pursuit of “many trivial
matters
not related
to disarmament”: “Iraq had destroyed its proscribed weapons, and
the details
were
unimportant.”
517.
Mr Aziz
also stated that Iraq:
•
had not
achieved the capability indigenously to produce engines and
gyroscopes
for
proscribed missiles and, therefore, “accounting fully for such
components
was
unnecessary”;
•
would not
clarify the extent of its attempts to produce VX: the issue was
“closed”
and Iraq
was only ready to discuss the evidence available to UNSCOM
of
incorrect
declarations;
•
had already
presented all the evidence available on biological weapons and
no
additional
information or documentation would be provided; and
•
refused to
provide access to one document previously seen by the UNSCOM
on
the grounds
that it was unrelated to its work.
205
UN Security
Council, 17 June 1998, ‘Report by the Executive Chairman of
the Special Commission
established
by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of
Security Council resolution 687
(1991), on
his mission to Baghdad, 11-15 June 1998’
(S/1998/529).
117