9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
885.
On 6 June, at
the request of the FCO, the JIC examined the current influence
of
Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI, formerly SCIRI) and Badr, their
future strategy
and the
extent of Iranian influence on them.484
It
judged:
“Increasing
frustration with Prime Minister Maliki has led the Islamic
Supreme
Council of
Iraq (ISCI) to explore alternative alliances … Ultimately, ISCI
wants to
be the
dominant Shia political party.
“The Badr
Organisation’s evolution from militia to political party has been
largely
cosmetic.
Badr remains ISCI’s paramilitary wing; its prime goal is control of
Iraq’s
security
institutions. It holds a disproportionate number of command posts
in the
police and
is trying to secure similar authority in the army. Most of its
members in
the Iraqi
Security Forces remain loyal to their former Badr command
structures and
many
continue to pursue a partisan, and by its nature, sectarian
agenda.
“ISCI/Badr
have made common goals and close links with Iran … However,
ISCI/
Badr’s
willingness to take instruction from Tehran has probably been
diminishing
since 2003
and Iran’s ability to direct political outcomes in Iraq is limited
…
“Participation
by the Office of the Martyr Sadr in provincial elections
tentatively
scheduled
for December is likely to reduce ISCI/Badr’s power in many
provinces
across the
South. Fierce competition for the Shia vote is likely to lead to
increasing
violence
between Badr and JAM. ISCI/Badr may win the most votes in Basra,
but
this will
not necessarily translate into effective control.”
886.
On 7 June, Maj
Gen Shaw reported that as a result of Qadir’s death there
were
“encouraging
signs that a real blow has been dealt to JAM’s capability and will
in the
city”. He
commented:
“Whilst JAM
will continue to try to attack our people and will no doubt portray
our
eventual
departure as their victory, the more important question now for the
future
security of
Basra surrounds the relationship between JAM and the ISF … Just
as
it will be
the Sunni who rid Iraq of AQ, so the Shia are potentially the main
threat to
Iranian
influence. But turning Iraqi nationalists against their
co‑religionists is made
more
difficult by our presence. Reconciling MAS/OMS [Muqtada
al‑Sadr/Office of the
Martyr
Sadr] and hence reconcilable sections of JAM to the ‘GOI now’ as
opposed to
the ‘GOI
after MNF’ is vital.”485
484
JIC
Assessment, 6 June 2007, ‘The Role of ISCI and Badr in
Iraq’.
485
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 7 June 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 07
June 2007’.
165