The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1.
This Section
addresses:
•
the
decision to withdraw UK forces from Basra Palace, including
the
development
of the negotiations to ensure a safe exit and UK plans for
the
future deployment
of its troops;
•
the UK’s
role in the transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) in Basra;
and
•
the UK’s
relationship with the Iraqi Government, including steps to
safeguard the
legal
status of UK forces, and responses to the Charge of the Knights in
Basra.
2.
This Section
does not address:
•
the UK
contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq and reform of its
security sector,
covered in
Sections 10 and 12 respectively.
3.
The Inquiry’s
conclusions in relation to the events described in this Section can
be
read in
Section 9.8.
4.
Mr Gordon
Brown succeeded Mr Blair as Prime Minister on 27 June 2007. In
his
new Cabinet
he appointed Mr David Miliband as Foreign Secretary and
Mr Douglas
Alexander
as International Development Secretary. Mr Des Browne remained
in post as
Defence
Secretary. Baroness Scotland became the Attorney
General.
5.
Mr Brown
also reorganised the structure of Cabinet Committees, as is usually
the
case when a
new Prime Minister takes office. Iraq fell within the remit of the
Committee
on National
Security, International Relations and Defence (NSID), and
specifically its
Overseas
and Defence Sub-Committee (NSID(OD)).
6.
Mr Brown
spoke to President Bush on the telephone shortly after he arrived
at
No.10.1
Mr Brown
said that he believed there were a number of ways forward in
Iraq
and looked
forward to further discussions with the President, including by
continuing
Mr Blair’s
practice of holding regular video conferences.
7.
Mr Brown
told the Inquiry that he had talked to President Bush both before
and
after
becoming Prime Minister about the UK’s future plans for Iraq,
making clear the
commitment
to “finish the job” in Basra:
“Over time
we would be reducing the number of troops but only as the Iraqis
were
capable of
taking control of law and order … And he was perfectly satisfied
with what
we were
doing … We had a series of phone calls as well during the summer
of 2007
as we
developed this new strategy …”2
1
Letter
Henderson to Hayes, 27 June 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Phone Call with
President Bush’.
2
Public
hearing, 5 March 2010, page 153.
182