8 | The
invasion
436.
In Basra, the
water and electricity supplies were being fixed and order was
being
restored
with the exercise of civic responsibility by local Iraqis. A Joint
Commission was
being
established with the emerging leadership there. The intention was
to spread the
same effect
northwards.
437.
Concluding the
discussion, Mr Blair said that the military campaign in Iraq
was
going
extremely well, but there were challenges ahead on the humanitarian
front,
in dealing
with post-conflict arrangements and bringing together the
international
community
in the UN Security Council. Mr Blair reiterated his conclusion
at the previous
meeting of
Cabinet that making the lives of ordinary Iraqis better was key to
success.
438.
When
Mr Blair spoke to President Bush on 10 April, they discussed
the position
in Iraq,
including the possibility of a major battle in Tikrit and the need
to warn Syria
not to
give refuge to regime figures or to scientists who knew about
Iraq’s WMD.272
439.
The UK AO was
extended north to al-Amara in Maysan province on 11 April,
when
Pathfinders
from 16 Air Assault Brigade entered the city. The remainder of the
force
440.
Mr Hoon
approved the extension of the UK AO to the whole of the
provinces
of Basra
and Maysan on 12 April.274
441.
The background
to that decision and subsequent developments are
addressed
later in
this Section.
According
to Gen Franks’ account of his plan:
“… US,
Brit, and Australian Special Operations Forces would control Iraq’s
western
desert,
preventing the regime freedom of action to launch long-range
missiles
towards
Jordan and Israel.” 275
Gen Franks
described the combination of “several thousand” US Special Forces
soldiers
and Special
Mission troopers, plus “British and Australian Special Air Service
operators”,
assembled
in Jordan and Saudi Arabia ready to attack western Iraq as “the
largest combat
formation
of special operators in history”.
From 23
March, the MOD sent regular updates on Special Forces’ activities
in Iraq
23
March: UK Special
Forces were deployed to Iraq’s western desert,
conducting
operations
to deny theatre ballistic missile operations.
272
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 10 April 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Conversation
with Bush, 10 April’.
273
Minutes, 12
April 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
274
Minute
Watkins to CJO, 12 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Expansion of the UK
AOR’.
275
Franks T
& McConnell M. American
Soldier. HarperCollins,
2004.
276
Letter
Williams to Manning, 23 March 2003, ‘Update on Special Forces
Activities’.
79